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I. INTRODUCTION
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as "a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter as-
serted."' A statement, in turn, is "(1) an oral or written assertion or
(2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by the person as an
assertion."2 Hearsay is inadmissible unless it falls within an exception
to the rule3 or an exclusion from the definition. 4  Courts and
commentators often write as if the distinctions they make between
hearsay and nonhearsay are consistent with informal reasoning,5 the
* Professor, Mississippi College School of Law. B.A., University of Iowa; J.D., Harvard Law
School. The Author would like to thank Ronald J. Allen, Richard B. Kuhns, William H. Page,
Roger C. Park, Michael L. Siegel, and Peter Tillers for comments on various drafts over a number
of years; Pamela S. Gerity, Anthony C. Hayes, M. Michelle Van Hook, and Petra Van Kampen for
adroit research; the International Seminar on Evidence in Litigation and the Society for the
Reform of Criminal Law for the opportunity to discuss these ideas at workshops; the Faculty of
Law at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands, for providing timely seclusion; and Mississippi
College School of Law for grants that helped to support this research.
1. F.R.E. 801(c).
2. F.R.E. 801(a).
3. F.R.E. 802.
4. F.R.E. 801(d). For a discussion of the function of the exclusions as opposed to the
exceptions, see note 170.
5. See, for example, United States v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99, 102 (3d Cir. 1983); Lyle v.
Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433-34 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pacelli, 491 F.2d 1108, 1116-17 (2d
Cir. 1974); The Queen v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 261-62, 2 W.L.R. 656, 681-82, 2 All E.R. 345,
368-69 (H.L. 1992); Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 177, 178-79 (1948); Christopher B. Mueller, Post Modern Hearsay
Reform: The Importance of Complexity, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 367, 417 & n.149 (1992); Roger C. Park,
"I Didn't Tell Them Anything About You' Implied Assertions as Hearsay Under the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 783, 800-01 (1990); Eleanor Swift, A Foundation Fact Approach to
Hearsay, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 1339, 1362 (1987). Compare arguments for abolishing hearsay doctrine
that rely on notions of informal reasoning: Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in Nonjury Cases, 83
Harv. L. Rev. 1362, 1363 (1970) (stating that in a bench trial, a court should be able to rely on
hearsay inadmissible in a jury trial "if it is 'the kind of evidence on which responsible persons are,
accustomed to rely in serious affairs" (quoting NLRB v. Remington Rand, 94 F.2d 862, 873 (2d
Cir. 1938)); Jack B. Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iowa L. Rev. 331, 353 (1961); Paul
J. Brysh, Comment, Abolish the Rule Against Hearsay, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 609, 622, 625 (1974). Of
course, Professor Morgan's analysis of the hearsay dangers represents the conventional legal
wisdom about the informal reasoning humans use to evaluate hearsay, although some authorities
disagree with Morgan's labels for the inferential dangers hearsay poses, or with his view of the
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inferential methods based on common experience that human beings
employ in litigation as well as everyday life.6  There is certainly good
reason to take account of informal reasoning in conceptualizing
hearsay. Interpretation of terms such as "assertion" and "assert" to
reflect the process people use to make everyday judgments takes
maximum advantage of human experience, and is therefore easy for
courts and lawyers to learn and apply. But courts, rulemakers, and
scholars have failed to develop a workable and accurate model of
informal reasoning on which a clear understanding of hearsay could
rest. One result of that failure is the debate over the proper ambit of
the hearsay rule that has recurred since the Exchequer Chamber
decided Wright v. Doe d. Tatham7 over a century and a half ago.
Conventional attempts to distinguish hearsay from nonhearsay
produce baffling results. Consider one understanding of the hearsay
definition, which might be called the "literalist heuristic." Literalist
analysis 8 holds that, for hearsay purposes, a communication ordinarily
precise risk each poses. F.R.E., Article viii, Advisory Committee's Note, itself relies on Morgan,
although describing the sincerity danger "as an aspect" of his other three dangers. For a fuller
discussion of Morgan's model, see notes 145-54 and accompanying text.
The term "informal reasoning" does not imply any of the following: (i) that informal reasoning
would inevitably lead to the same result regardless of the person employing it, (ii) that informal
reasoning excludes reliance on the results of formal study when the reasoner would choose to
rely, or (iii) that the results of informal reasoning are necessarily inferior to the results of formal
methods. This Article uses the term "informal reasoning" to describe non-technical reasoning, to
avoid using terms such as 'practical reasoning," which may carry considerable theoretical
baggage in cognitive science or philosophy irrelevant here. See Gilbert Harman, Change in View:
Principles of Reasoning 1 (M.I.T., 1986).
6. See, for example, Schulz v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 350 U.S. 523, 526 (1956); Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 18 (1955). F.R.E. 702 provides that '[i]f scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified... may testify thereto... [,]J" thus recognizing both judges' and
jurors' informal reasoning. Compare Jurek v. Estelle, 623 F.2d. 929, 980 (5th Cir. 1980) (relying
on 'common sense" in reviewing lower court conclusions on the voluntariness of confession).
7. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (Ex. Ch. 1837), affd, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
8. Those who follow the debate on implied assertions may consider this another term for
what Professor Park first called the 'assertion-oriented" approach. See Roger C. Park, McCor-
mick on Evidence and the Concept of Hearsay: A Critical Analysis Followed by Suggestions to
Law Teachers, 65 Minn. L. Rev. 423, 427 (1981). Professor Park's terminology has since gained
some currency. See, for example, Paul R. Rice, Should Unintended Implications of Speech Be
Considered Nonhearsay? The AssertivelNonassertive Distinction Under Rule 801(a) of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 65 Temple L. Rev. 529, 531 & n.6 (1992); Glen Weissenberger,
Unintended Implications of Speech and the Definition of Hearsay, 65 Temple L. Rev. 857, 857
(1992). An adherent of the assertion-oriented approach may accept it only for pragmatic reasons,
however, rather than because of a belief in quasi-literalist semantics in communication. This
pragmatic position largely reflects Professor Park's rationale. Park, 74 Minn. L Rev. at 829-38
(cited in note 5). In contrast, McCormick on Evidence has been fairly dogged in its literalism. See
Charles T. McCormick, Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 228 at 446 (West, 1954) (labelling
'Harold is the finest of my sons" nonhearsay to prove the declarant was fond of Harold). Park, 65
Minn. L. Rev. at 427, is a trenchant criticism of such literalism. The treatise may have retreated
from that extreme position. See John W. Strong, et al., eds., 2 McCormick on Evidence § 246
(West, 4th ed. Practitioner's ed. 1992) ("McCormick 4th') (omitting discussion of that point).
Professor Park might even classify this Article's co.operative approach to hearsay 'assertion-
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asserts only those propositions that it literally, expressly, or directly9
articulates. 1° The sheer unreality of the notion of literal interpreta-
tion" frequently results in anomalies, for example, in prosecutions
alleging sexual abuse of children or illegal distribution of drugs. The
prosecution might offer a seven-year-old's statement, "Sex is disgust-
ing," in a molestation case, arguing it is nonhearsay to show the child
was molested because it does not declare that the child has been in-
volved in a sex act, but rather demonstrates an attitude toward sex
that is circumstantial evidence of abuse.12 Alternatively, the prosecu-
tion in a drug case might offer a single call, answered by an officer
during a raid: "Is Joe there? I'm trying to buy some drugs." The
oriented" because it considers nonhearsay false statements offered to show the speaker's
awareness of a third person's guilt. See Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 426; note 193.
9. Of course, these terms seem to set up a straw man, in view of the difficulty of attaching
any one objectively certain meaning to an utterance. Paul Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden
Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks About, 75 Ky. L. J. 841, 850 (1987). One cannot, however,
describe this view of "assertion" without occasionally using terms such as 'literal," "direct,' or
"primary." See, for example, Weissenberger, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 861 (cited in note 8).
10. See, for example, United States v. Limehouse, 950 F.2d 501, 503 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 208,
212-13 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18, 31 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v.
Groce, 682 F.2d 1359, 1364 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Day, 591 F.2d 861, 883 (D.C. Cir.
1978); United States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 469 (E.D. Ky. 1980). See also Park, 74 Minn. L.
Rev. at 817-19 n.183 (cited in note 5). See also note 18, which includes cases in which the courts
relied on their view of the literal meaning of communications to hold those communications
nonhearsay. Commentators who use the same analysis include Richard D. Friedman, The
Elements of Evidence 143 (West, 1991) (declaring that the statement, "Look at my daughter
move," spoken to another bystander at a soccer game, does not assert that the person moving is
the speaker's daughter within the meaning of the Federal Rules); Graham C. Lilly, An
Introduction to the Law of Evidence (West, 2d ed. 1987) (criticizing Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7
Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838), arguing that "the letters were not offered to prove anything expressly
said therein"); Jack B. Weinstein and Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence Manual
14.02[02] at 14-13, 14-14 (Matthew Bender, Student ed. 1987); Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 532
(cited in note 8).
11. See, for example, Bergman, 75 Ky. L. J. at 850, 855-63 (cited in note 9) (discussing the
weaknesses in the notion that it is possible to arrive at an objective, literal interpretation of an
utterance). An adherent of the literalist heuristic who notes this weakness contends it is
relatively inconsequential: "The question is not whether any possible situation exists in which the
definition would allow dubious evidence to be received, but whether in everyday operation it does
a capable job of sorting." Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 793 (cited in note 5). See also McCormick,
Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 225 at 460 (cited in note 8) (attempting to justify the literalist
heuristic's anomalies by stating, "Simplification has a measure of falsification.").
In addition, adherents of the literalist heuristic in hearsay doctrine would be unlikely to urge
its use in other contexts. F.R.C.P. 49(a) provides the best example of the legal system's
abandonment of literalism in a related context. That rule provides that if a court does not submit
an interrogatory on an issue to the jury, and fails to make a specific finding on that issue, the
court is "deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict." See
also James Boyd White, Justice as Translation xi (U. of Chicago, 1990) (stating that "little of what
happens in any real utterance is reducible to the words uttered); Gregory Currie, Interpretation
and Objectivity, 102 Mind 413 (1993).
12. See notes 293-98 and accompanying text.
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prosecution could argue that the call was nonhearsay on the theory
that it did not declare that Joe was selling or had ever sold drugs. 13
Judicial and scholarly use of the literalist heuristic and related
strategies for curtailing the reach of the hearsay rule, such as the
concept of verbal parts of acts, or of circumstantial use of statements
that supposedly does not depend on the speaker's accuracy, 14  has
created much of the oft-bemoaned complexity in hearsay doctrine.
Terms such as "assertion" and "nonassertive verbal conduct," inter-.
preted in accord with the literalist heuristic, become arcane, 5 forcing
judges, teachers, and students to apply distinctions with no substan-
tial basis, in the manner of creaky but marginally useful automatons.
Common perceptions that a conceptual muddle inevitably results from
any distinction between hearsay and other evidence 6 compound the
problem. Ironically, the original literalists may have formulated
strategies for curtailing the reach of the hearsay rule to effect radical
change reflecting their ideas of reliable inference in informal reason-
ing.17 Federal courts frequently rely on the literalist heuristic, but the
multiplicity of attendant problems has led some courts to ignore it, or
to refuse explicitly to apply it.18
13. See notes 301-18 and accompanying text.
14. See notes 278-318 and accompanying text.
15. See note 191 for a dogmatic interpretation of the term "assertion." On nonassertive
verbal conduct, see, for example, Ronald J. Allen and Richard B. Kuhns, An Analytical Approach
to Evidence 321-22 (Little, Brown, 1989):
We use the term nonassertive to describe the verbal conduct in Wright both because it is a
convenient shorthand and because the term is frequently used to describe the evidence in
Wright and similar cases.... [lit is important to note that the term is technically inaccu-
rate and potentially misleading. Almost every verbalization is a manifestation of an in-
tent to assert something: thus, the likely presence or absence of a sincerity problem does
not usually depend upon whether the declarant is intending to make an assertion.
16. See Ronald J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn.
L. Rev. 797, 799-800,802 (1992).
17. See Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 457-58 (cited in note 8); Olin Guy Wellborn I, The
Definition of Hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence, 61 Tex. L. Rev. 49, 59, 91-92 (1982).
18. The first person to notice this possibility may have been Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 78
(warning that "confining the hearsay definition to assertions offered for their literal meaning will
not be tolerated by anyone") (emphasis in original). Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 827-28 (cited in
note 5), notes that applications of the literalist heuristic that result in classifying implied
assertions as hearsay "generally have arisen in situations in which the [hearsay] dangers are
minimal,' indicating that courts may use the heuristic to rationalize decisions made on other
bases. A number of circuit courts conflict regarding the treatment of various implied assertions.
See, for example, United States v. Figueroa, 750 F.2d 232, 238-41 (2d Cir. 1984) (hearsay); United
States v. Giraldo, 822 F.2d 205, 213 (2d Cir. 1987) (nonhearsay); United States v. Mahar, 801 F.2d
1477, 1491-92 (6th Cir. 1986) (hearsay); United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 466-67 (6th Cir.
1986) (nonhearsay); United States v. Parker, 991 F.2d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1993) (hearsay);
United States v. Cowley, 720 F.2d 1037, 1044-45 (9th Cir. 1983) (same); United States v.
Jaramillo-Suarez, 950 F.2d 1378, 1382.84 (9th Cir. 1991) (nonhearsay); United States v. Patrick,
959 F.2d 991, 999-1002 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (hearsay); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d 1572, 1579-80
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (nonhearsay). In addition, although the bases for the court's rulings are not
entirely clear, United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1174 (5th Cir. 1993), and United States
1994]
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Other prominent views of hearsay rely on accounts of human
reasoning that fare no better. Literalism's leading competitor, Profes-
sor Morgan's dangers approach, rests on a flawed model of human
communication. 9 That model leads the dangers theory to misclassify
non-communicative conduct as nonhearsay20 and to overestimate the
value of cross-examination. 21
Because traditional legal analyses have failed to draw a work-
able and theoretically sound distinction between hearsay and non-
hearsay, it is necessary to turn to disciplines that study human deci-
sionmaking systematically. This Article offers an alternative to the
traditional analyses of the distinction between hearsay and nonhear-
say: co-operative analysis. Co-operative analysis, derived from cogni-
tive science and other empirical research 22 about human decision-
making, makes the theory of hearsay more comprehensible and both
streamlines and clarifies the system of hearsay rules. The linchpin of
v. Wiley, 979 F.2d 365, 369 (5th Cir. 1992), seem to treat the implied assertions in those cases as
hearsay, consistent with Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Brown,
548 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1977), but contrary to United States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1981). The Third Circuit refuses to follow the literalist analysis. See, for example, United States
v. Reynolds, 715 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1983). Although the Supreme Court has never squarely
confronted the issue, it has treated communications offered to show propositions not expressly
articulated as hearsay without addressing literalist arguments. See, for example, Dutton v.
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77, 88 (1970); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441-42 (1949). See
also Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 809-10 (cited in note 5); note 100.
19. See notes 142-54 and accompanying text.
20. See notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
21. See notes 219-28 and accompanying text.
22. Three scholars recently have analyzed the informal reasoning used to evaluate hearsay
in interdisciplinary terms. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a Partial Economic Game-Theoretic
Analysis ofHearsay, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 723 (1992); Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedure
for Resolving Hearsay Issues, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 883 (1991); Richard D. Friedman, Route
Analysis of Credibility and Hearsay, 96 Yale L. J. 667 (1987); David Schum, Hearsay from a
Layperson, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1992); Peter Tillers and David Schum, Hearsay Logic, 76 Minn.
L. Rev. 813 (1992). Professors Schum and Tillers reserve judgment about the wisdom of the
existing hearsay rules for a number of reasons. Tillers and Schum, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 857-58 &
n.55. Professor Friedman briefly exposes the inconsistency between wholesale treatment of
implied assertions as nonhearsay and hearsay theory, Friedman, 96 Yale L. J. at 723-29, but
apparently approves of treating at least some implied assertions as nonhearsay in accord with
prevailing practice. Id. at 681-83. The definition of hearsay under F.R.E. 801(a) or (c) is essen-
tially peripheral to Professor Friedman's empirical study, which focuses on the conditions for
admission of evidence once it has been classified as hearsay. But see note 10 for a discussion of
Friedman's use of the literalist heuristic to exemplify positive law.
Another set of studies presented at.the University of Minnesota's Hearsay Reform Conference
questioned the juror distrust rationale for the hearsay rule, which presumes that jurors will
overvalue hearsay. See Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park, and Steven C. Penrod, Jurors'
Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1992); Peter Miene, Roger
C. Park, and Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76
Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992); Richard F. Rakos and Stephen Landsman, Researching the Hearsay
Rule: Emerging Findings, General Issues, and Future Directions, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 655 (1992).
None of the studies specified the jurors' inferential processes in evaluating hearsay, as opposed to
the jurors' results, nor did any study directly address the distinction between hearsay and
nonhearsay.
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co-operative theory is research showing that the process of communi-
cation necessarily conveys a substantial amount of information that
the communicator never verbalizes.2 Cognitive science demonstrates
that human beings, including factfinders, must employ decision-
making shortcuts for complex tasks to avoid cognitive gridlock.24
Whenever a court classifies as nonhearsay a communication offered to
establish a proposition that it implies, but does not articulate, the
court permits the receipt of that communication without proof of the
facts that satisfy an exception to the hearsay rule. Evidence that
satisfies the exceptions' conditions helps factfinders who are
evaluating a communication offered for a hearsay purpose to use their
personal experience, specifically, strategies for evaluating
communications, to maximum benefit.25 By stressing the importance
of implication in communication, co-operative theory reveals how the
prevailing assumptions about factfinders' evaluations of out-of-court
communications are flawed, and the consequences of those flaws.
To explain the flaws in conventional hearsay analysis that
cognitive research exposes, this Article first illustrates the literalist
heuristic's application in a problematic context: irony. It then offers a
sounder alternative to the conventional rationale for exclusionary
rules based on brief accounts of both the nature of lay reasoning about
facts and human inferences from communication. After applying that
scholarship to the standard justifications for, and criticisms of,
hearsay and other exclusionary rules, the Article concludes with an
exploration of hearsay doctrine's treatment of implied assertions,
possibly evidence law's most dramatic deviation from informal reason-
ing.
II. THE LITERALIST HEURISTIC AND IRONY IN HEARSAY DOCTRINE
Applying the Federal Rules' definition of hearsay to ironic
utterances to prove propositions that the speaker might have in-
tended, but did not articulate, poses problems for literalists. Analysis
of the problem demonstrates the conflict between the results of the
literalist heuristic26 and the needs of factfinders relying on their own
informal reasoning. Suppose a murder defendant were to claim that
23. See notes 74-86, 134-57, 184-85, and accompanying text.
24. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
25. See notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
26. Of course, differences exist among the approach's adherents. Professor Park is perhaps
the most cautious adherent of the literalist heuristic. See, for example, Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at
799 (cited in note 5).
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the police mishandled evidence at the scene of the crime and falsely
accused him. Defendant offers the statement of Reporter, a since-
deceased veteran of the police beat, to show that the forensics officer
at the scene, Daryl, damaged the evidence, a shell casing, in a way
that prejudiced the defendant. A witness heard Reporter say to the
officer 'Yup. Way to go, Daryl, way to handle the shell casing flaw-
lessly." The witness says that Reporter "seemed to be sort of a wise-
acre about it." The central question for this Article is whether Re-
porter's statement would be hearsay to show that Officer Daryl mis-
handled the evidence.
A zealous literalist27 must either classify the statement as
nonhearsay or do a very fast shuffle to explain why the statement is
hearsay.2  Courts and scholars often use the term "implied assertion"
to refer to a proposition for which a communication that did not di-
rectly articulate the proposition is offered in evidence.2 9 Perhaps the
most distinctive consequence of the literalist position is the recurrent
argument that implied assertions are not part of "the matter asserted"
for hearsay purposes.30
The most prominent current proponent of the literalist heuris-
tic, McCormick on Evidence, defines the term "assert" as "to say that
something is so."31 Reporter did not articulate any proposition other
27. 2 McCormick 4th §§ 246-250 at 97-117 (cited in note 8) is one of the most persistent
sources of the literalist heuristic.
28. The prosecution's best hearsay argument would be that Reporter obviously meant to
assert that Officer Daryl damaged the evidence. Adherents of the literalist approach, however,
have seldom permitted the declarant's intention to determine the content of an assertion for
hearsay purposes. See notes 278-83, 311-17, and accompanying text.
Insofar as other objections to admission are concerned, Reporter would be more likely to make
the statement if Daryl erred than if she had not, so it would be relevant in that sense. The
prosecution's best argument under literalist theory for excluding the evidence would be to argue,
based on F.R.E. 403, that the prejudicial impact of Reporter's comment would outweigh its
probative value. Reliance on Federal Rule 403 leaves unanswered an interesting question.
Members of the literal statement school's heavy reliance on Rule 403 indicates that their own
definition is underinclusive. See Ted Finman, Implied Assertions as Hearsay: Some Criticisms of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 682, 694, 698, 702 (1962). See notes 51 and 244.
29. Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 788 (cited in note 5). The term may also refer to proffers of
non-communicative conduct to prove a proposition that the actor might have believed. For a
discussion of the hearsay status of such conduct, see notes 205-18 and accompanying text.
30. See, for example, Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 418 (cited in note 5).
31. 2 McCormick 4th § 246 at 97 (cited in note 8). The literalist heuristic can be traced back
to Professor Wigmore, who treated "I did X" as nonhearsay to show that the speaker believed she
did X, while 'I think I did X7 would be hearsay for that same purpose. John H. Wigmore, 3 A
Treatise on the System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law §§ 1715, 1788, 1790 (Little, Brown,
1904). See also Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1983); Eustace Seligman, An Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, 26 Harv. L. Rev. 146, 150-51 (1912). McCormick has disclaimed at least one
of the more extreme results of the literalist heuristic. 2 McCormick 4th § 250 at 112 n.21. See
also note 35 and accompanying text. The treatise undoubtedly approves of cases that adhere to
literalist analysis, however. Id. at 111-12 n.19. Specific examples are discussed in notes 278-318
and accompanying text.
[Vol. 47:43
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than that Daryl handled the shell casing flawlessly, and possibly that
Daryl's work was praiseworthy. The statement, then, according to
McCormick's literalism, would not assert that Daryl erred. Accord-
ingly, it would be nonhearsay to prove that Daryl erred, even though
many hearers would understand Reporter's comment to mean that
Daryl made some sort of mistake.
Adherence to the idea that a statement only asserts what it
articulates would seem to compel the conclusion that Reporter's
statement should be admissible. While hearsay scholarship to date
has included relatively little 2 systematic discussion of irony, critics of
the literalist approach frequently have mentioned that consistent
literal interpretation of an utterance would forbid the court to classify
communications offered to show propositions communicated by meta-
phor as hearsay.3 Literalism likewise invites courts to regard ques-
tions or nondeclarative utterances as completely outside the hearsay
rule because such utterances do not "say something is so." The courts
often have accepted the invitation.34 Under these circumstances, there
is no reason that the courts should stop at exempting figures of speech
from hearsay. The new full edition of McCormick on Evidence, depart-
ing from what had been a zealous defense of literalism, admits that
communications may assert (for hearsay purposes) propositions con-
veyed by metaphor, noting the certainty of the declarant's intention,
the "inevitability of the implication," and the "greater likelihood of
deception" as compared to other implied assertions.35 Even if such a
rationale conforms to the remainder of McCormick's analysis,36 squar-
ing the treatment of ironic statements as hearsay with hearsay literal-
ism remains tricky.
32. The prime example is Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 534-35 (cited in note 8). See also
Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 189 (cited in note 5); Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note 5);
Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 73-74 (cited in note 17).
33. Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 799 (cited in note 5); Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 78-79 (cited
in note 17); Weissenberger, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 860 n.17 (cited in note 8); Madeleine Sloane and
D. Barratt Irwin, Comment, Hearsay: The Threshold Question, 9 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 14 n.48
(1976).
34. See, for example, United States v. Oguns, 921 F.2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990); United
States v. Lewis, 902 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1990). For general discussion of some courts' use of
nondeclarative sentences as nonhearsay, see, for example, Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 795 & n.58
(cited in note 5).
35. 2 McCormick 4th § 250 at 112 n.21 (cited in note 8).
36. Certainly, a need for a difficult judgment about the degree of explicitness defeats the
treatise's claim that its test is clear. Id. § 246 at 98 n.5. See David E. Seidelson, Implied Asser-
tions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A Quandary for Federal Courts, 24 Duquesne L. Rev.
741,759 (1986).
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The sort of irony in which the defendant would argue Reporter
engaged does not fit McCormick's reasoning about metaphor37 First,
Reporter's intention is foggy. She may have intended to point out an
error in Officer Daryl's handling of the shell casing, which might or
might not be the error the defendant would allege. Reporter alterna-
tively might have meant to tell Daryl that handling the shell casing
flawlessly was not a significant accomplishment.38 Second, irony
assumes some sort of insincerity. The claim that Reporter was being
ironic is thus a claim that she did not mean to convey the proposition
that she expressly articulated, but rather to convey that she did not
believe the proposition herself.39 Of course, she simply could have
been trying to embarrass Daryl by praising her performance. Consid-
ering the degree of indirection inherent in irony, it is significant that
literalist theorists tend to believe that indirectness ensures sincerity,
and that the possibility of insincerity is the principal risk that hearsay
creates in factfinding.40 It is doubtful that ironic utterances fall within
the classic literalist understanding of hearsay, unless they are nudged
while falling.41
To label the ironic statement hearsay and avoid the anomaly,
hard-core literalists could argue, based on notions of intention or of
intention to assert a proposition, that the relevance of Reporter's
statement would stem from Reporter's intent to convey a flaw in the
37. Indeed, Professors Sperber and Wilson argue that irony and metaphor differ, relying on
the idea that irony "plays on the relationship between the speaker's thought and a thought of
someone other than the speaker." Dan Sperber and Deidre Wilson, Relevance: Communication
and Cognition 243 (Harvard U., 1986). If so, Reporter clearly did not articulate 'the thought of
someone other than the speaker," which would therefore make Reporter's utterance nonhearsay
to show Daryl erred under the literalist heuristic.
38. While the uncertainty of Reporter's intention creates an obvious problem, one should
keep in mind that the literalist heuristic often analogizes the use of verbal conduct to prove
propositions that it does not articulate with the nonhearsay use of noncommunicative verbal
conduct to prove propositions that the actor may have believed. 2 McCormick 4th § 250 at 108-13
(cited in note 8). Professors Lempert and Saltzburg argue in favor of treating nonassertive
conduct as nonhearsay because the ambiguity of such conduct is so obvious that jurors will be
wary of it. Richard 0. Lempert and Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence: Text
Problems, Transcripts and Cases 368 (West, 2d. ed. 1983). See note 211 and accompanying text.
Accordingly, it is not at all clear that the ambiguity risk would require classifying the irony as
hearsay.
39. See, for example, Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 239
(cited in note 37).
40. See, for example, Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Importance of the Memory Factor in
Analyzing the Reliability of Hearsay Testimony: A Lesson Slowly Learnt--and Quickly Forgotten,
41 Fla. L. Rev. 215, 219-22 (1989); Glen Weissenberger, Hearsay Puzzles: An Essay on Federal
Evidence Rule 803(3), 64 Temple L. Rev. 145, 149 (1991). In fact, the hearsay dangers are
mutually dependent. See notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
41. See Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 534-35 (cited in note 8).
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gathering of evidence.2 Because the literalist heuristic by definition
requires exclusion of some implied assertions from hearsay, such uses
of intent are ad hoc in the extreme-a wild card4 used whenever the
literalist theory's results seem too anomalous. Difficult questions
about whether a particular statement conveys a proposition with
sufficient directness are, of course, antithetical to a heuristic based on
the notion of literal statement.44 The communicator's intention in
42. See note 35 and accompanying text. Compare Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 800 (cited in
note 5) (exemplifying the use of a theory of intention by a critic of the literalist heuristics
extremes).
Professor Michael Seigel suggests another possible argument for labelling Reporter's irony
nonhearsay: Reporter may have assumed that Daryl erred, taken for granted that she would
agree, and accordingly, intended only to tease her. Distinguishing between hearsay and
nonhearsay in terms of whether the speaker specifically meant to assert, or merely to assume, the
proposition at issue has several weaknesses, two of which are relevant here.
First, distinguishing between such assertions and assumptions would impose a dubious a
priori, or quasi-literalist, interpretation of Reporter's utterance. It is at best questionable that a
speaker who made a statement such as Reporter's would be more likely to intend simple disap-
proval, rather than to convey both the idea that Daryl had erred and Reporter's criticism.
Accordingly, imputing to Reporter an assumption that an error was obvious, based on her
utterance, rests on sand at least as prone to shift as the typical foundation for a literal
construction of the utterance.
Second, assume the language in Reporter's statement was more likely to be uttered if
Reporter assumed, but did not consciously intend to communicate, that Daryl erred. One might
further contend that if Reporter did not think she was conveying novel information about Daryrs
evidence handling, the statement presented no sincerity risk if offered on that issue-the absence
ofa specific intent to communicate entailed an absence of intent to deceive. That result, however,
rests on the premise that Reporter could not intend to deceive when she did not utter words
indicating a specific intent to communicate Daryl's error. That premise, in turn, rests on the
assumption that persons who intend the hearer to reach a false conclusion would articulate that
conclusion expressly, rather than simply misleading the hearer. Deceivers are probably more
successful if they make statements that, although innocuous in most contexts, would lead hearers
to draw false conclusions in the context in which the statements are uttered. See Mueller, 76
Minn. L. Rev. at 414 n.140 (cited in note 5) (pointing out that 'deceivers convey very little 'false
information," and accordingly, that a distinction similar to a specific intent test 'seems likely to
treat as nonhearsay much that is embraced by the doctrine").
For further discussion of specific intent, or assertion-assumption, arguments, see notes 139
and 190.
43. For instance, the purchaser in The Queen v. Kearley, 2 App.Cas. 228,2 W.L.R. 656,2 All
E.R. 345 (H.L. 1992), undoubtedly meant to convey a belief that Kearley might make drugs
available. There is no difference in degree or intensity of intention between the use of the
statement in Kearley to show that Kearley intended to sell drugs and that in the hypothetical to
show that Daryl erred. For a more complete discussion of Kearley, see notes 301-18 and
accompanying text.
44. Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 759 (cited in note 36), points out that distinguishing
between hearsay and nonhearsay in terms of the explicitness of assertions, when one is willing to
treat some implied assertions as hearsay, 'would impose on the courts an ongoing difficult task:
determining if the disparity between the fact to be inferred and the fact explicitly or impliedly
asserted was sufficiently great to justify characterizing the declaration as nonhearsay."
Professor Park, a flexible literalist, has suggested to the Author that use of a notion of
intention to classify irony as hearsay is relatively straightforward and does not make literalism
too indeterminate for a heuristic. Although literalist use of intent to deal with irony seems
natural, it creates uncertainty when one tries to square it with literalist treatment of other
communications as nonhearsay, such as the letters in Wright. See Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 801
(cited in note 5) (describing the Wright letters as nonhearsay). See also notes 42, 139, and 190
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communicating45 is critical in distinguishing hearsay from nonhear-
say. Co-operative analysis offers a theory of intention in communica-
tion that is consistent with the Federal Rules' hearsay definition
without constructing secret passages or trap doors for abandoning
that standard whenever its results are intuitively unacceptable.
Although implication such as that present in understanding
ironic statements is a common component of communication, contro-
versy over the hearsay status of implied assertions (that is, contro-
versy over the extent to which an out-of-court communication must
have literally conveyed the fact for which it is offered to be hearsay)
has continued for many years.46 The disagreements may seem espe-
cially odd, since a ruling that a statement is hearsay for a particular
purpose does not entail a further ruling that the statement is
inadmissible for that purpose. 47 Nevertheless, the Federal Rules8 are
so murky on the issue that they contain some support for almost any
argument in the debate over implied assertions.49 If law is, as Holmes
said, a prediction of judicial action, ° the Federal Rules' distinction
between hearsay and nonhearsay is poor law.
Hearsay doctrine, including the Rules, bears the scars of
battles based on black letter legal rules and convenient behavioral
assumptions, in the absence of empirical information about the ways
in which human minds actually decide questions of fact.51 The
(discussing problems of the use of specific intent to limit the scope of assertions); notes 258-74 and
accompanying text (discussing Wright and Professor Park's use of a specific intent theory to
analyze the case, as opposed to the general intent theory necessary to classify irony as
nonhearsay). While it is important for the reader to understand the differences between theories,
it is also important to realize that the results of co-operative analysis in many cases parallel those
of Professor Park's carefully nuanced literalism.
45. See notes 73-86, 134-57, and accompanying text.
46. At least since Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
47. Edmund M. Morgan, Hearsay and Non-Hearsay, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 1138, 1147 (1935).
See Allen, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 799-800 (cited in note 16).
48. Including the Advisory Committee's comments. See notes 176-88 and accompanying
text.
49. See, for example, note 18 (citing conflicting cases on the treatment of various implied
assertions).
50. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457,457-58 (1897).
51. While this Article relies on some fairly recent empirical scholarship, the reader should
realize that the theories underlying this scholarship have been well known in various disciplines
for decades. For example, Paul Grice first introduced his maxims of communication in 1967. H.
Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words v (Harvard U., 1989).
The stress on cognitive research to model the hearsay rule may seem "reductionist* in that it
relies very heavily on one theory to model the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay.
Professor Park has identified a number of explanations for rules excluding hearsay, the classic
reason being that the hearsay's reliability has not been tested. Roger C. Park, A Subject Matter
Approach to Hearsay Reform, 86 Mich. L. Rev. 51, 55 (1987). The in-court witness may report the
out-of-court statement inaccurately. Id. at 56-58. The jury may grossly misvalue the testimony,
particularly given the lack of similarity between trials and more familiar decision-making
contexts. Id. at 59. The rule prohibiting hearsay that does not fall within an exception helps to
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hearsay rules necessarily become more obscure whenever courts and
commentators applying the rules rely on unrealistic views of human
communication. Evidence law, however, is not doomed to follow such
views. Regardless of how one views the status of evidence teachers'
favorite chestnuts, hearsay at its core concerns the ways in which
human factfinders evaluate data that others communicate to them,
often relying on the statements of third persons.5 2 Research in
cognitive science indicates that humans use a process of reasoning
about communications3 that resembles some accounts of inference
from hearsay commonly found in cases and commentary.
Nevertheless, conventional evidence doctrine has failed to get the
process right. Recognition of conventional doctrine's flawed empirical
assumptions is a cornerstone for a modification of conventional theory
that is more easily understood and more congruent with the
importance of the factfinder's role in litigation.
III. HUMAN DEcIsIoNMAKING AND EVIDENCE
A. Limitations on Human Capacity and Strategies to Overcome Them
Using empirical research about human mental processes to
formulate and interpret evidence rules has at least two benefits.
Obviously, those who are knowledgeable about the behavior that the
rules purport to govern can appraise the likely results of their actions
avoid unfair surprise to adversaries, who may be unprepared to oppose the evidence effectively.
Id. at 62. Free admission of hearsay raises the possibility of misuse of judicial discretion under a
provision allowing for a discretionary test specific to hearsay. Id. at 63. Misuse of discretion also
might pose a problem if abolition of the hearsay rule remitted the court to more general
admissibility standards such as F.R.E. 403. See note 244. Free. admissibility of hearsay also
might encourage jury lawlessness and reward parties who fabricate evidence. Park, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. at 63-64. Prohibiting hearsay avoids time-consuming efforts to impeach hearsay declarants,
id. at 64, and helps those who face adversaries who in turn have the power or resources to distort
or generate information. Id. at 65-66. Although this Article disagrees with the reasons that imply
or assume distrust of jurors' reasoning capacities, see notes 98-106 and accompanying text, the co-
operative theory's emphasis on obtaining information about communications to help the factflnder
evaluate the speaker's compliance with the maxims of co-operation seems consistent with any of
the other reasons Professor Park mentions. Information about the circumstances in which the
communication allegedly took place would, for instance, tend to reduce the likelihood that a
fabrication would be successful.
52. James B. Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law 501, 518-19
(Little, Brown, 1898). Mirjan Damaska, Of Hearsay and Its Analogues, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 425, 425
(1992), says much the same for non-adversary systems.
53. See notes 73-86, 134-57, and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the processes
of communication.
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or arguments more accurately than those without that knowledge.5
More subtly, as the accuracy and clarity with which the rules reflect
the empirical world increase, the effort and costs of interpretation and
application, including the effort needed to train new lawyers and
judges, decrease. 55 Cognitive science, which deals with human reason-
ing under uncertainty, is a natural source of empirical models for
evidence, particularly because it emphasizes the efficient use of cogni-
tive resources in problem-solving.
Cognitive psychology reveals significant limits on the human
mental workspace,5 specifically on the ability to organize masses of
54. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L. J. 557,
563-64, 621 (1992) (stressing the importance of lowering the cost of learning law).
55. If, as seems to be the case, the literalist heuristic's distinction between hearsay and
nonhearsay is essentially artificial, it is doubtful that its application produces any social benefit.
At most, one could argue that the existence of the heuristic does not cause the courts to make de-
cisions about the admission of evidence they would not otherwise make. The cases cited in note
18 indicate that a number of circuits, as well as the Supreme Court, are not thoroughgoing
literalists. Even assuming arguendo that a court's decisions to use the literalist heuristic were
completely pragmatic, the heuristic is still theoretically weak. The sheer unreality of its distinc-
tion between hearsay and nonhearsay requires a good deal of extra effort for (i) courts, who have
to reconcile their decisions with it; Cii) parties, who must plan their arguments about the admis-
sibility of evidence by anticipating whether the court will adhere to one understanding of hearsay
as opposed to another; and (iii) students, who must learn a number of approaches to the Federal
Rules' treatment of hearsay. See, for example, Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 449-56 (cited in note 8)
(advising instruction based on both assertion-oriented and declarant-oriented approaches). The
cynicism that lawyers, judges, and law students tend to develop as a result of exposure to
irrational doctrines multiplies the costs of such doctrines by producing more unprincipled
arguments and ad hoc decisions that create greater future costs. See Michael L. Seigel, Rational-
izing Hearsay: A Proposal for a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 893, 949 (1992).
While it is true that those who have been trained in the literalist model can now apply it
(albeit with some difficulty, see, for example, notes 258-318 and accompanying text), the costs of
training are already spent and, for most decision-making purposes, initiates will have some
success in applying almost any theory that has gained a level of acceptance, whether ultimately
tenable or not. No one would ever accept a theory, even provisionally, unless it yielded some
worthwhile results. See, for example, Nicholas Rescher, Cognitive Economy: The Economic
Dimension of the Theory of Knowledge 128-29 (U. of Pittsburgh, 1989); Paul Thagard, Explanatory
Coherence, 12 Behav. & Brain Sci. 435, 437 (1989). In reality, then, a fair share of the resources
expended to further apply the literalist model may be a dead-weight loss.
56. This observation is more than a truism that follows from the fact that the mind-brain is
a finite system. Although the exact number of pieces of information that one's consciousness can
contain and manage at any one time varies with the nature of the task and the individuals
involved, one standard measure is seven "chunks," give or take three. See, for example, Howard
Gardner, The Mind's New Science 122 (Basic Books, 1985). Herbert Simon's research, for
example, revealed that this working capacity is limited to seven random one-syllable words, cet.
par. Herbert A. Simon, How Big Is a Chunk?, in Herbert A. Simon, Models of Thought 50, 52
(Yale U., 1979). Simon's point is not that chunks are of an invariant size, either among
individuals or for any given individual; rather, Simon's research shows the extremely limited
nature of a human's mental workspace. Experience in a particular domain, or the individual's
ability to perceive meaningful relationships among the data in that domain, appear to expand the
size of chunks, or the capacity of one's memory for a particular task. Herbert A. Simon and
William G. Chase, The Mind's Eye in Chess, in Simon, Models of Thought at 404, 413.
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data in the mind and to employ those data to solve problems. 7 These
limits on humans' practical capacity to understand, evaluate, and
draw inferences from information require the adoption of decision-
making strategies that use limited resources efficiently. A brute effort
to review all possibly pertinent information before making a decision
is futile. The debate over the use of Bayesian logic as a model for deci-
sionmaking under conditions of uncertainty, including factfinding in
litigation, illustrates the importance of effectively employing one's
cognitive resources.5 A growing number of critics of Bayesian meth-
ods hold that Bayesian logic, or any other effort to require inference
from all data available or from prior experience, would demand
fantastic computational feats from the human mind, or, in its stead, a
computer.I
The increased efficacy of problem-solving known as human
expertise largely results from the experts' use of strategies for select-
ing critical data. Experts select data to delineate more precisely a
problem in their domain and, eventually, to apply a familiar procedure
to solve the problem. Chess masters60 and physics teachers61 differ
from novices in their ability to perceive familiar patterns and to use
critical data to solve problems in those fields. This ability is crucial
when dealing with large amounts of data. For example, the average
possible lines of play on a chessboard, considering the next two possi-
ble moves for each player, would amount to one million; for three
moves, one billion.62 Assessing the alternatives, considering only each
player's possible first two moves, would take about three months and
twenty-five days.6 Chess masters and others relying on experience to
57. This research typically specifies the hypothesized theory as a computer program, and
then tests itby repeated iterations of the program. For example, if the program's output does not
conform to human performance, then the hypothesis is an inadequate specification of the human
decision-malcng procedure. See, for example, Herbert A. Simon, The Information Storage System
Called "Human Memory" in Simon, Models of Thought at 62, 68 (cited in note 56).
58. See generally Christopher Cherniak, Minimal Rationality 8-12 (M.I.T., 1986) (arguing
that the problem of limited cognitive capacity must necessarily affect judgments about the
rationality of forms of human reasoning); Harman, Change in View at 5-6, 10, 26 (cited in note 5)
(arguing same).
59. Cherniak, Minimal Rationality at 92-95 & n.13; Harman, Change in View at 25-27 (cited
in note 5); Pat Langley, et al., Scientific Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative
Processes 39-40 (M.I.T., 1987).
60. Simon and Chase, The Mind's Eye in Chess, in Simon, Models of Thought at 404, 420
(cited in note 56).
61. Micheline T. H. Chi and Robert Glaser, Problem-solving Ability, in Robert J. Sternberg
ed., Human Abilities, An Information-Processing Approach 227, 243-46 (W.H. Freeman, 1985).
62. Herbert A. Simon and Peter A. Simon, Trial and Error Search in Solving Difficult
Problems, in Simon, Models of Thought at 175 (cited in note 56).
63. Actually, it would take 115.74 days, under the reasonable assumption that evaluating
each possibility would take ten seconds. Id. at 178 & n.3.
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solve problems thus rationally 4 must use strategies6 5 to keep the
demands on their resources within workable bounds. Tailoring trial
procedure to capitalize on these strategies, therefore, can help
factfinders apply the informal reasoning that is their raison d'etre.
B. Common Sources of Organizing Strategies
A critic might argue that, although such strategies seem intui-
tively likely and desirable, no one a priori correct6 6 strategy exists for
gathering and organizing data to solve problems such as making
inferences about past events from present data.6 7 It could follow that
the assumption that humans can or do learn to use common strategies
to organize and sort data for problem-solving has no a priori basis.
Accordingly, without an a priori correct strategy, any attempt to re-
flect ordinary reasoning in rules of evidence would be futile. While it
may be impossible to establish that any given procedure is a priori
optimal for a specific problem,6 considerable empirical evidence
reveals that humans derive common problem-solving strategies from
at least two related sources. The more basic source is shared mental
and physical capacities. Although limited, human capacities provide
means of grappling with problems-interpersonal measuring sticks by
which humans can assess problems or data. Humans can depend on
the relative constance of their mental and physical capacities and
frame problems with these first-order tools, which can address prob-
lems directly in the short run. Repeated applications of these capaci-
ties can produce tools or constructs for solving problems in the long
run. Under these assumptions, the body itself necessarily provides
some ways of structuring experience by organizing and managing
data in the memory.69
64. This is only to say that the use of strategies is an aspect of rational behavior, not that it
is an exclusive prescription for such behavior.
65. These strategies are sometimes called 'schemata." See generally Craig R. Callen,
Second-Order Considerations, Weight, Sufficiency and Schema Theory: A Comment on Professor
Brilmayer's Theory, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 715, 718-22 (1986).
66. A critic might also argue that the derivation of problem-solving strategies is wholly
subjective. The text following this note recapitulates some of the evidence showing the origin of
common problem-solving strategies in a culture.
67. See John H. Wigmore, 1A Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 37.7 (Little, Brown,
Peter Tillers rev. ed. 1983) (arguing that no a priori distinctions exist among atoms of evidence).
68. Although the problem is beyond the scope of this Article, scholars continue to engage in
ongoing philosophical efforts to describe such systems. See, for example, Cherniak, Minimal
Rationality (cited in note 58); Harman, Change in View (cited in note 5); Paul Thagard, Concep-
tual Revolutions (Princeton U., 1992).
69. See, for example, Mark Johnson, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Memory,
Imagination and Reason (U. of Chicago, 1987).
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The second source, culture, which emerges from numerous and
disparate applications of these mental and physical capacities, is itself
a way of seizing on critical data and employing procedures to resolve
problems.70 Together, these two sources create distinctions among
data that are, for all human intents and purposes, real. For instance,
no machine can test whether the color of a shirt is red unless that
machine has been calibrated to classify the light waves reflected from
the shirt against externally established wavelengths. 7' Humans ac-
quire the ability to distinguish red in a different manner. While it is
true that some languages lack a term for the color, red (or its cognate)
is invariably the third color term to develop in the evolution of lan-
guages. 72 Thus, although no a priori argument appears for a distinc-
tion between red and white, and certainly some people cannot make
such a distinction, it invariably appears in the development of cul-
tures.
Of course, other means may exist by which humans can iden-
tify successful strategies, even though they might not be optimal for
philosopher-kings. At a minimum, however, there are mechanisms
that are practical and necessary sources of strategies for organizing
information and making decisions based on it. The lack of clear a
priori justification for such strategies should not preclude rulemakers
or courts from using rules of evidence that reflect ordinary reasoning.
Factfinders essentially evaluate evidence offered at trial by
making inferences from communications. Those inferences rest on
data that attorneys and witnesses (and the court in a jury trial)
convey to guide factfinders' reasoning or to persuade them to draw
particular conclusions. As with any other inferential problem,
humans use an inferential strategy to derive information from com-
munications. Knowledge of the operation of that strategy underscores
the importance of rules limiting admissibility of evidence, particularly
of rules limiting the admissibility of out-of-court communications.
This Article first discusses the rationale for admissibility rules and
addresses judges' and commentators' objections to their use. The
Article then develops a rationale for the exclusion of hearsay that does
not rely on distrust or disparagement of the jury, but recognizes and
respects jurors' reliance on informal reasoning.
70., See Erving Goffmnan, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience, 21-
39 (Harvard U., 1974).
71. The source of the example is James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science 164-66
(Viking, 1987). On the neurophysiology of colors, see George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Things: What Categories Reveal About the Mind, 26-30 (3. of Chicago, 1987).
72. Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous Things at 24-26.
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C. Problem-Solving and Human Communication: Evidence Rules and
Inference
1. Exclusionary Rules and Communication
An efficient inferential process requires strategies for limiting
the amount of data employed to resolve a problem. The strictures of
rationality in human decisionmaking strongly imply rules limiting the
admissibility of evidence. Rules that allow the court to exclude irrele-
vant, prejudicial, or otherwise inappropriate evidence need not be
based on distrust of jurors. Instead, such rules result from a recogni-
tion that factfinders necessarily devote considerable effort to the trial,
employing learned strategies to assess the evidence and to understand
the communications they receive from the parties, 73 thus respecting
ordinary reasoning.
Humans have developed strategies that allow them to convey,
or infer, a great deal of information based on verbal communications
that often are incredibly brief. Grice's maxims of co-operation,74 a
theory of the nature of communication, especially conversation,7 5
generally recognized by philosophers, cognitive scientists, linguists,
and psychologists, among others,7 6 describe the set of assumptions at
the core of the strategy. To illustrate how those implicit conventions
work in communication, compare two utterances at the dining table:
"Can you pass the pepper?" and "I wish to season my food with pep-
73. See Sperber and Wilson, Relevance Communication and Cognition at 156-57 (cited in
note 37). This rationale is consistent with the courts' application of evidence rules in bench trials,
a phenomenon that does not square with the juror distrust theory. Dale A. Nance, The Best
Evidence Principle, 73 Iowa L. Rev. 227, 229-30 (1988). Of course, the jury, as factfinder, also
receives information from the court.
74. See, for example, Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 26-27 (cited in note 51).
75. Although Grice chiefly discusses conversation, his theory extends much more broadly.
See, for example, id. at 295-96.
76. See, for example, Umberto Eco, The Limits of Interpretation 257 (Indiana U., 1990)
(semioticist); Michael Garman, Psycholinguistics 305, 387 (Cambridge U., 1990) (psycholinguist);
P. N. Johnson-Laird, Mental Models 38 (Cambridge U., 1983) (psychologist-cognitive scientist);
Roger C. Schank, The Connoisseur's Guide to the Mind 88 (Summit, 1991) (computer scientist-
artificial intelligence theorist); John R. Searle, Expression and Meaning 32 (Cambridge U., 1979)
(philosopher); Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 246 (cited in note
37) (linguists.cognitive scientists-Sperber and Wilson try to simplify Grice's maxims into one or
two maxims, but the differences are irrelevant here); Daniel Kahnemann and Amos Tversky, On
the Study of Statistical Intuitions, in Daniel Kahnemann, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds.,
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 493, 501-04 (Cambridge U., 1982)
(psychologists). For empirical support, see, for example, Richard J. Gerrig, Process Models and
Pragmatics, in N. Sharkey ed., 1 Advances in Cognitive Science 23, 38 (1986); Raymond Gibbs,
Literal Meaning and Psychological Theory, 8 Cognitive Sci. 275 (1984).
77. The source of the example is Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Contextual Effects in Under.
standing Indirect Requests, 2 Discourse Processes 1, 10 (1979). For a discussion of the role that
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per, and you may have access to some, which I request." With two
people at the table, psychological and linguistic research indicates
that humans ordinarily would consider "Can you pass the pepper?" to
convey the speaker's desire to season her food with pepper, the
speaker's belief that the hearer has access to some pepper, and the
speaker's request for pepper. For example, passing the butter nor-
mally would be an inappropriate response to "Can you pass the pep-
per," as would simply answering "Yes." 7 In typical two-person dining,
therefore, the first request conveys all the second might-the second
would seem either eccentric or designed to convey some proposition or
propositions markedly different from those articulated.
In light of Grice's maxims,79 the speaker would not specifically
articulate her desire for pepper, or her perception of the food, in order
to communicate them. First, Grice says, the speaker should be nei-
ther more nor less informative than required for the purpose of the
exchange: dining. Second, the speaker's utterances should relate to
the purposes of the exchange. Third, the speaker should be perspicu-
ous: orderly, brief, and clear. In conversation at the table, the
speaker would not need to articulate the reason for her question.
Fourth, the speaker should try to make her contribution true; she
should not say what she believes false or unsupported by adequate
evidence. If the speaker realized that her dining companion were
manacled to the chair, unable to reach anything on the table, the ut-
terance would convey a joke or ironic comment rather than any con-
clusion about the hearer's access to pepper.8°
Humans' recognition, implicit or explicit, that time and cogni-
tive resources are limited provides the underpinnings of this co-opera-
tive social strategy. A speaker who wishes to communicate effectively
with others, particularly in conversation, must realize that her in-
tended audience will devote their resources to processing her commu-
nication only when the communication seems sufficiently likely to
benefit them. On the other hand, her prospective audience will realize
intonation could play in helping the hearer understand the utterance as a request, see Dwight
Bolinger, Intonation and Its Parts: Melody in Spoken English 304 (Stanford, 1986).
78. Of course, the addressee of the initial statement might answer IYes" to express
disapproval of the initial speaker's table manners.
79. When circumstances show that the speaker has violated one or more conventions, the
communication still conveys implicit information. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 32-37
(cited in note 51). For simplicity, this Part excludes those situations.
80. Deciding whether the speaker has violated the third and fourth maxims entails
inferences about the traditional hearsay dangers. In other words, whenever conventional hearsay
doctrine interprets the words of an utterance narrowly, positing that the utterance only 'asserts"
that interpretation, it risks ignoring all of the hearsay dangers-not merely the danger of
ambiguity or misstatement-and missing the true significance of the communication.
1994]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47:43
that ordinarily", she has no reason to communicate anything to them
that would not warrant their attention and reliance. 2 The members
of the audience will then assume that the communication is useful for
the members' own purposes. 3 Communication that is "useful" in that
sense conforms to Grice's maxims by, for example, referring to matters
that the audience would consider relevant to their interests, and
omitting matters that lack evidentiary support adequate to warrant
the audience's effort to understand and evaluate the communication."
For example, if a person were to say, "Now that's a hair brush,"
when she and a friend were both examining a hair brush, the friend
would normally be entitled to infer that she meant to communicate
something other than the identity of a household object. Otherwise,
the communication would be inefficient for both speaker and hearer.8 5
If the speaker made a sufficient number of useless communications,
her friend would tend to ignore her, reducing the likelihood that she
could benefit from future communications. Accordingly, she would not
merely intend to inform her friend that the object is a hair brush, but
instead could seek to convey a number of other things, depending on
the context in which she made the statement. For example, she might
want her friend to infer that the brush is of exceptional quality, that
she had finally found a brush, or that the object she found was not the
object she expected to find.8
81. Of course, the speaker may intend to mislead her hearers, but that effort likely would
succeed only if her hearers adopted a default strategy in reliance on cultural conventions, such as
trusting the speaker. See notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
82. Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 156-57, 160-61 (cited
in note 37).
83. Id.
84. The communication's usefulness also depends on whether it would increase the
factfinder's difficulty in framing the issue correctly, that is, in using the correct substantive
standard, thus outweighing any benefit from its admission. See notes 88-90 and accompanying
text. Compare Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 287-88, 292 n.308 (cited in note 73) (advocating the
exclusion of evidence when adequate appraisal would require excessive time spent explaining
flaws in evidence to the jury). In this Article, the term "effort" includes both the unconscious
expenditure of resources and conscious endeavors to solve problems or understand phenomena.
See id. at 241 n.67. Nance uses a similar element in his test for admissibility of evidence, but does
not rely on cognitive theory. Id. at 271.
It follows from the discussion in the text that if the court fails to recognize the jury's need to
limit its intake of information, the jury likely will disregard the evidence and decide according to
their pre-trial assumptions. Compare Park, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 63-64 (cited in note 51)
(explaining that free admission of evidence that the jury considers unreliable "gives the jury a peg
on which to hang a verdict").
85. This assumes the speaker had sufficient reason to believe her friend could identify hair
brushes.
86. See, for example, Kahnemann and Tversky, On the Study of Statistical Intuitions in
Kahnemann, Slovic, and Tversky, eds., Judgment Under Uncertainty at 493, 501-04 (cited in note
76). Of course, she could be employing irony, which is also consistent with this theory. See note
37.
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2. Recognition of the Maxims of Co-operation Implicit in Evidence
Doctrine
Although evidentiary doctrine does not reflect the full range of
knowledge about inference from communications, courts and commen-
tators often have noticed the effect of the implicit conventions that
undergird communications. Professors Allen and Morgan have
pointed out that the use of the term "presumption" in jury instructions
tends to confuse the jury. When a judge uses that term to character-
ize a particular inference, jurors might well assume they should ac-
cord that inference more weight than they otherwise would. By digni-
fying the inference with a legal label, the judge implies that the jury
should accord special deference to that inference.87 The core of the
difficulty is the jurors' natural assumption that the court would not
refer to the inference as a "presumption" unless the court intended to
commend that inference to them. In addition, the judge's position as
an expert on the law and as a representative authority figure rein-
forces the implicit endorsement of the presumptive inference.
If the court and the jury recognize that the court knows more
about faults occurring in data presented in litigation, and about the
requirements of substantive rules at issue, the jury would naturally
infer that the court, by admitting evidence, believes it useful to the
jury, and the court would expect the jury to make that inference.8
This view of laypersons' natural process of inference at trial implies
87. Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 843, 856-
57 (1981); Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury upon Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 47
Harv. L. Rev. 59,73-77 (1933).
88. Discussions of the proper use of expert witnesses continually address the possibility
that decision-making novices in a particular domain might defer excessively to other, ostensibly
more expert decisionmakers. See, for example, United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030
(11th Cir. 1988); Michael Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence, § 703.2 at 632 (West, 2d ed.
1986); 1 McCormick 4th § 17 at 73 (cited in note 8). See also James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers'
Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Ef-
fects of Admitting and Excluding Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 619, 636-44
(1984). For a discussion of the utility of deference to experts in an efficient disciplinary commu-
nity, see Philip Kitcher, The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity
Without Illusions 88-89 (Oxford U., 1993). Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S.
Ct. 2786, 2798 (1993), relies heavily on cross-examination, opposing evidence, judicial instruction,
summary judgment, and directed verdicts to compensate for this deference, but also permits the
use of F.R.E. 403 to exclude evidence that can be "quite misleading because of the difficulty in
evaluating it.'" Id. (quoting Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence Is
Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)). For a discussion of the jurys role
in legal interpretation, see, for example, Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U.
L. Rev. 487, 492-94 (1986).
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the relevance requirement and other exclusionary rules as well.89
Recognition of the role of these inferential strategies does not imply
that jurors are inferior or untrustworthy, but rather merely requires
the court to respect the jury's role as a lay decision body entitled to
expect judicial co-operation (in the Gricean as well as other senses) in
performing its tasks. Accordingly, in recognition of the Gricean prin-
ciple of co-operation, courts and rulemakers must limit admissible
data to those with marginal utility for inference about matters at
issue,90 keeping in mind the risk of miscommunication about the na-
ture of the jury's task.
These rules also reflect two prime differences between factfind-
ing in litigation and inference about everyday events. First, because
litigation generally occurs considerably after the events at issue, the
data presented at trial represent only a sample of the information
available when the litigated events occurred. Rules that exclude
evidence whose apparent usefulness does not warrant the effort neces-
sary to evaluate it may ameliorate that artificiality-without the
rules, the parties might not offer supporting data sufficient to allow
factfinders to evaluate the evidence fully.9 ' Second, the role of
factfinders, even judges, is more passive than the role of
decisionmakers in ordinary contexts; factfinders cannot gather
further information or insist that others do so, nor can they postpone
decisionmaking until they receive further evidence .92 Judicial
factfinders also make one-time judgments about strangers, who have
extraordinary incentives to distort information, and decide in the
89. See, for example, Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021, 1032-
37 (1977) (using a regret, or utility, matrix to model the extent to which evidence may encourage
jurors to employ normative values in the factfinding process).
90. It is not clear whether Professor Nance agrees that exclusions serve this purpose, al-
though he would exclude evidence that "invites decision upon an improper basis" because an
adversary's use of such evidence would be unethical. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 292 (cited in note
73) (original emphasis omitted).
The argument in the text also implies rules of preference under Professors Nance and Seigel's
"best evidence principle." Id. at 233-34; Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 897-98 (cited in note 55). The
need to use the factfinders' capacities efficiently should restrict the admissibility of evidence
whenever the proffering party can obtain a substitute for the evidence that would allow the
factfinders to make the same inference with less cognitive effort. For example, an original
document is better evidence of its own contents than a handwritten copy would be, because the
jury need not resolve issues about the copy's accuracy. See F.R.E. 1002. Not all evidence rules
under the co-operative theory are rules of preference, however.
91. See, for example, Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 387 (cited in note 5); Nance, 73 Iowa L.
Rev. at 264 (cited in note 73); Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 917 (cited in note 55); Eleanor Swift, A Re-
sponse to the "Probative Value" Theory of Hearsay Suggested by Hearsay from a Layperson, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. 103, 107 (1992).
92. Swift, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. at 103 (cited in note 91). Bergman, 75 Ky. L. J. at 862 (cited
in note 9), notes that inferential risks from the uncertainty inherent in linguistic communication
are particularly acute for passive decisionmakers.
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context of unfamiliar institutions. 93 The judicial system thus must
give parties adequate incentives to provide factfinders with data
compatible with the factfinders' learned strategies for evaluation of
evidence.94
In addition, rules that exclude evidence based on its lack of
marginal utility minimize misunderstandings that may result from
receipt of data that lack any signifidant bearing on the issues under
the applicable substantive rule, but clearly bear on other strategies for
resolving the dispute. For example, considering the prevalence of auto
liability insurance, the insured status of a defendant driver in an auto
negligence case has, at most, only trifling probative value on whether
the driver was negligent. If the court 'received that evidence, the
jurors likely would recognize that it had little bearing on negligence.
The evidence would, however, clearly suggest possible loss-spreading
strategies. 5 Because the evidence obviously lacks value on the negli-
gence question, jurors might assume that the judge admitted the evi-
dence for its relevance to a preferred, or at least tolerable, strategy for
resolving the dispute: requiring the defendant's insurance carrier to
bear the loss. Whenever imprecise instructions or vague rules of law
might leave jurors uncertain about the specific issues they are to
resolve96 jurors could reasonably conclude that the questions on which
the proffered evidence bore were those critical to resolving the dispute,
and that any contrary understanding was mistaken.9 7
While evidentiary doctrine often reflects an intuitive recogni-
tion that communication to factfinders depends on implicit inferences,
no systematic analysis of evidence law has resulted. That inatten-
tiveness to the communicative process may underlie many criticisms
of exclusionary rules, as well as many of the black letter arguments
for such rules.
93. Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 383 (cited in note 5); Park, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 60-62 (cited
in note 51).
94. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 234-36,291 (cited in note 73); Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1355-58
& n.45 (cited in note 5).
95. See Lempert, 75 Mich. L. Rev. at 1038 (cited in note 89). This Article does not endorse
such strategies, but rather points out that receipt of the evidence would imply to the jury some
degree ofjudicial endorsement or tolerance of such strategies.
96. Jurors probably realize that their understanding of some issues is imperfect at best.
Compare Robert L. Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 Hastings L. J. 456, 467-68 (1962)
(discussing jurors' difficulty in understanding proximate cause instructions).
97. See, for example, Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering
Negative Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 Cal. L. Rev. 1011, 1014 n.7
(1978). Compare United States v. Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 976-77 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (Weinstein,
J.) (evidencing the judge's concern with admitting evidence that might impress a factfinder, yet
would be of low probative value).
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3. The Distrust Rationale and Its Critics
The conventional wisdom suggests that rules excluding evi-
dence, including hearsay rules, exist because the judiciary and legisla-
ture distrust the jury."' The distrust rationale falls short for several
reasons. First, excluding evidence because the jury cannot adequately
appraise it conflicts with the jury's function as the ultimate factfinder,
which requires the jurors' independent evaluation of the evidence."
Second, hearsay and other evidentiary rules apply, within the limits of
standards of review for findings of fact, to bench trials.10° Judges in
bench trials need not exclude the evidence to which such rules refer,
but strict limits constrain reliance on it. If the distrust rationale
undergirds the exclusionary rules that restrict judges, the question is
whether its adherents trust anyone to evaluate evidence correctly.
Third, reliance on the distrust rationale requires the question-
able assumption that one can appraise the necessary true value of the
evidence, or of categories of evidence, without regard to other evidence
in the case.10 1 To draft rules that exclude entire categories of evidence,
rulemakers who agree with the distrust theory must also assume that
the rulemakers themselves can definitively appraise the value of
evidence in the categories without regard to other evidence available
in a particular case. For example, consider the hearsay exception for
present sense impressions. Professor Waltz argues that X's
statement, "I see Y out mowing his yard," offered as X's present sense
impression to show Y was capable of physical labor, should be
inadmissible under the exception without corroboration of Y's actions
from a witness who observed Y directly. 102 It is difficult to see how one
98. Gordon Tullock, The Logic of the Law 93-94 (Basic, 1971); Jack B. Weinstein, Alterna-
tives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375, 377 (1967); Brysh, Comment, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev.
at 623 (cited in note 5); Note, The Theoretical Foundation of the Hearsay Rules, 93 Harv. L. Rev.
1786, 1788 (1980). Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 278 (cited in note 73), traces this rationale to battles
over the division of power between judge and jury.
99. See, for example, Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 271 (cited in note 73); Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev.
at 1368 (cited in note 5); Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1805 (cited in note 98).
100. In Moore v. United States, 429 U.S. 20 (1976), the Court summarily reversed a
conviction in a bench trial because the judge relied on a hearsay statement. The statement, that
defendant "and others were in possession of heroin at '[defendant's] apartment," offered to show
that Moore was a tenant, or resided at the apartment, would be nonhearsay under the literalist
heuristic. See, for example, Friedman, The Elements of Evidence at 143 (cited in note 10). The
Court did not, however, discuss the classification of implied assertions.
101. For discussion of the proposition that the reliability of evidence depends on the other
evidence available, see, for example, Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 912 (cited in note 55); Weinstein, 46
Iowa L. Rev. at 333 (cited in note 5); Brysh, Comment, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 624 (cited in note 5).
102. John Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:
Origins and Attributes, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 869, 883-97 (1981). For cases in accord, see Teree E.
Foster, Present Sense Impressions: An Analysis and a Proposal, 10 Loyola U. Chi. L. J. 299, 309 &
n.29 (1979).
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could appraise thevalue of such evidence categorically, in intellectual
isolation.1°3
A flexible, judge-centered, case-by-case standard1° would not
avoid the problem. Permitting judges to exclude evidence when the
facts in the case indicate it is unreliable 05 presumes that the judges'
own idiosyncratic or mistaken beliefs would not affect their evalu-
ations. In other words, the case-by-case standard rests on the ds-
sumption that only the judge can recognize the true value of the evi-
dence-an assumption both epistemologically unlikely and theoreti-
cally inconsistent with the right to a jury trial.106
While critics have scored any number of direct hits on the
distrust rationale, their arguments do not entail the abandonment of
hearsay doctrine or other exclusionary rules. Critics who seek to
abolish or curtail exclusionary rules typically base their arguments on
two superficially plausible premises that prove inaccurate on closer
examination: (i) exclusionary rules diminish the likelihood of accurate
results because access to further evidence improves factfinders' con-
clusionso? and (ii) factfinders can capably evaluate evidence at trial
because they evaluate all sorts of data in their everyday lives.
Successful decisionmakers limit the data they consider, focus-
ing on key facts to reach a solution.1°8 This limitation implies that
103. See, for example, Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1342, 1350 (cited in note 5). By examining
litigated cases, a rulemaker might try to compare the accuracy of corroborated and uncorrobo-
rated present sense impressions. This experiment would pose several problems. For example,
corroboration of Y's conduct based on independent observation tends to show that Y was mowing
the lawn, without regard to X's statement. Accordingly, if the study found corroborated state-
ments more reliable, it would simply be cloaking the obvious in new clothes: a proposition for
which there is one piece of evidence (the present sense impression) is less likely to be true than a
proposition for which there is a precisely analogous piece of evidence (the corroborated present
sense impression) and additional evidence (the corroboration).
104. Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 380 (cited in note 98).
105. For a discussion of reliability as a justification for hearsay exceptions, see notes 229-31
and accompanying text.
106. See Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 914 (cited in note 55) (explaining that a truly discretionary
power to exclude evidence "is too great to invest in individual trial judges") (footnote omitted);
Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 377 (cited in note 98) (stating that educated juries are capable of
evaluating hearsay).
107. Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 900-03; Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 381 (cited in note 98) (civil
cases); Brysh, Comment, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 622 (cited in note 5). Compare Nance, 73 Iowa L.
Rev. at 233 (cited in note 73) (indicating that completeness of evidence facilitates induction).
108. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text. Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 900-02 n.31 (cited in
note 55), recognizes the need to control the flow of information to decisionmakers, but says that
"factfinding is an extremely information-sensitive endeavor.* Id. He uses the idea of information-
sensitivity to support an argument that optimal inference under uncertainty should consider all,
or almost all, "logically relevant evidence.' Id. at 903. If logical relevance refers to evidence the
impact of which warrants the effort to evaluate it, there is no difference between Siegel's view
and that of this Article. On the other hand, if Siegel means to include any piece of data that
arguably bears on the decision, the demands of evaluating this data exceed human limits.
Consider the example of a chess game, discussed in notes 62-65 and accompanying text. Each
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efforts to consider all physically available data would adversely affect
the accuracy of decisions. Moreover, simple considerations of resource
allocation make forcing decisionmakers to consider all available data
inefficient. The first prong of the critics' attack on admissibility rules
thus sweeps too broadly, at best.
Arguments for reforming exclusionary rules that rely on fact-
finders' ability to evaluate data in everyday life assume that litigative
factfinding replicates the conditions of out-of-court inference. If courts
admit significant amounts of evidence that do not warrant the jury's
evaluation, courts implicitly endorse a good deal of information with
no apparent bearing on the problem-setting a profoundly counter-
intuitive task for the factfinder. In contrast, even flawed current
theories of the distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay help the
court replicate conditions under which jurors (and judges) make infer-
ences from the communications classified as hearsay in their lives
outside of court.1°9 If the statement is hearsay, its proponent must
show that it satisfies an exception by providing data that indicate that
the statement's possible probative value warrants the effort necessary
to process it; moreover, in so doing, the proponent must provide infor-
mation about the context in which the declarant made the statement,
or about the declarant herself, that helps to minimize the effort re-
quired to process the information. 10
possible position that can arise from a move bears on the move's desirability, but tracing all such
positions surpasses humans' cognitive capacity, at least if the time devoted to the task has
realistic limits. Professor Seigel notes that excessive admission of evidence may be
counterproductive, Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 904, but does not seem to believe that this
possibility, taken in tandem with the limits on human cognitive capacity, is significant for
factfinding. Id. at 915 n.69.
Professor Nance, who laid the cornerstone of current use of the best evidence principle,
acknowledges that the receipt of irrelevant information has costs even if the court has received all
relevant information. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 73). He also recognizes the
waste of cognitive resources resulting from the receipt of less than optimal evidence, id. at 241
n.67, and treats hearsay as a doctrine that seeks to avoid these costs. Id. at 281-84. On the other
hand, it is not clear whether Professor Nance would consider excluding evidence to avoid
misinterpretation of a substantive rule consistent with his approach. Compare id. at 227
(criticizing exclusions of evidence for 'probative dangers' of 'prejudic[ing] or misleading" the trier
as manifesting a "cynical attitude) with id. at 292 (discussing confusion of issues).
109. See, for example, 2 McCormick 4th, § 248 at 100 (cited in note 8).
110. See Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1355-61 (cited in note 5), for a discussion of the importance
of data about the declarant and the context in which she made the statement.
The hearsay exclusions operate somewhat differently, see note 170, but still maximize the
likelihood that the factfinder will receive information needed to evaluate out-of-court
communications.
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4. Alternatives to Exclusionary Rules
Scholars skeptical about the value of rules excluding evidence
that lacks marginal factflnding utility suggest three basic alterna-
fives. First, judges who would otherwise exclude evidence could
inform the jury that the court did not warrant or represent that any
evidence admitted had any value, and that the parties were expected
to expose any defects in others' evidence, Critics of rules restricting
the admission of evidence advance another alternative, arguing that
the adversariness inherent in the American system, in tandem with
the parties' desires to present the most persuasive and invulnerable
cases possible, should discourage proffers of weak evidence. 112 The
third argument attacks the rationale for distinctions between evidence
that lacks marginal utility and more useful information. Proponents
of this argument contend that because jurors know best what evidence
they consider probative, judicial exclusion of evidence for lack of
marginal utility relies on illegitimate a priori assumptions, even
though the theory underlying such exclusions purports to deny that
particular pieces of evidence have an ascertainable objective degree of
reliability. These three responses are less telling than they appear at
first glance.
Advising the jury that the court did not intend to endorse any
evidence by allowing its admission would only create more marked
divergence between the factfinding process and ordinary reasoning.
At its extreme, reliance on this tactic amounts to abuse of the jury.113
Substituting this warning for the use of exclusionary rules would, at
least formally, allow the parties to dump everything, including the
kitchen sink, on the jurors, making their task impossible.'1 4 If this
tactic were available, non-burden-bearing parties would have every
incentive to create a situation in which the jurors could not decide in
111. Weinstein, 46 Iowa L. Rev. at 336 (cited in note 5) (describing this approach as a
palliative for problems accompanying free admission of hearsay).
112. Ronald J. Allen, A Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401, 429 (1986);
Weinstein, 44 FR.D. at 377 (cited in note 98).
113. This tactic also would confuse the jury, conflicting with their implicit assumptions about
the process of communication. Some scholars argue that the need for the hearsay rule would be
alleviated if the judge were to comment on the possible value of the evidence. Weinstein, 46 Iowa
L. Rev. at 336 (cited in note 5); Brysh, Comment, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 625 (cited in note 5). These
arguments are flawed in essentially the same way as arguments for general warnings about
evidence in lieu of exclusionary rules. Because warnings about hearsay would address more
specific evidence, however, they would be even more anomalous than warnings about the
evidence in general.
114. See, for example, Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 919 (cited in note 55); Eleanor Swift,
Abolishing the Hearsay Rule, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 495, 514 (1987) (each discussing the parties'
incentive to offer hearsay in a system without a hearsay rule).
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the burden-bearing party's favor; they could force a tie by massive
overproduction or overproffer. Many critics consider the existing rules
of evidence too restrictive, yet judges point out that the amount of
evidence submitted in major litigation is frequently excessive.11 In
addition, substituting a judicial warning in lieu of any exclusionary
rules implies that the judicial system has no particular interest in the
way issues of fact are adjudicated. This is surely wrong: in criminal
cases, the Bill of Rights, inter alia, demonstrates the importance of
this interest; society has numerous interests in the way civil trials
determine issues of fact."s
The judicial system has limited resources: time, personnel,
money, and the human capacities of judges and jurors. Conflicting
demands on the resources, as well as their absolute limits, constrain
courts from expending them on information-gathering efforts with no
apparent point.117 The courts have good reason to insist on better
evidence than the parties would offer in the absence of exclusionary
rules.118 Otherwise, courts would waste economic or human resources
that could produce societal benefits if allocated to other tasks. 1 9 Pro-
motion of accuracy and predictability fosters optimal allocation of
resources in society at large.120 Finally, correct application of a rule, or
set of rules, benefits society.1 21 Increasing the quality of decisionmak-
115. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 708 F.2d. 1081, 1170-73
& nn.130, 132 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Reaves, 636 F. Supp. 1575, 1576-79 (E.D. Ky.
1986); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp. 77 F.R.D. 10, 15 (D. Conn. 1977); Roger W. Kirst, Finding a Role
for the Civil Jury in Modern Litigation, 69 Judicature 333, 337 (1986); Jury Comprehension in
Complex Cases 27-28 (Report of Special Committee of the ABA Section of Litigation, Dec. 1989).
Professors Saks's and Kidd's research indicates that parties may have an incentive to introduce
cumulative evidence that commentators often miss: "Redundant information makes certain facts
seem intuitively more probable, but in actuality it does not increase their likelihood." Michael J.
Saks and Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics,
15 Law & Soc'y Rev. 123, 136-37 (1980) (emphasis in original).
116. First, the fact that judicial action amounts to state coercion dictates some caution.
Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 231 (cited in note 73). Second, correct application of legal principles has
a social value. Ronald J. Allen, et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the
Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. Legal Stud. 359, 385, 388 (1990). The formulation of rules that
courts apply to determination of the facts on which they premise the application of legal rules
thus affects society.
117. Professor Lempert argues that unnecessary litigation costs are dead-weight losses.
Richard Lempert, The New Evidence Scholarship: Analyzing the Process of Proof, 66 B.U. L. Rev.
439, 470 (1986). Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 73), notes that admission of irrele-
vant evidence creates unwarranted litigation costs. For discussions of the utility of the hearsay
rule in avoiding waste of resources in litigation, see Roger C. Park, The Hearsay Rule and the
Stability of Verdicts: A Response to Professor Nesson, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 1057, 1059 (1986);
Weinstein, 46 Iowa L. Rev. at 336 (cited in note 5).
118. See Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of Statistical Evidence, 65 Tulane
L. Rev. 457, 475-482, 486 (1991).
119. Id. at 486; Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 233, 241 (cited in note 73).
120. Callen, 65 Tulane L. Rev. at 482-84, 486 (cited in note 118).
121. Allen, et al., 19 J. Legal Stud. at 388 (cited in note 116).
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ing on facts underlying the application of those rules therefore has
social value, even in simple civil disputes that may seem merely to be
disputes between parties.
Relying on parties and counsel to expose defects in their oppo-
nents' evidence seems excessively optimistic. Parties seeking to per-
suade jurors have an incentive both to restrict their presentation to
facilitate jurors' comprehension 122 and to expose flaws in their oppo-
nents' evidence. Accordingly, critics would say, exclusionary rules are
not necessary to prevent parties from inundating the jury or present-
ing flawed evidence.12 Yet counsel often have, or believe they have,
offsetting incentives to confuse the jury or to over-prove their clients'
cases. Furthermore, the parties' interest in factfinding methods or
exposure of evidentiary flaws often differs markedly from the state's.
The parties' lack of incentive may manifest itself in several
ways. If a small amount is at stake, individual parties may present a
much less effective case than if their interests were aggregated.1 24 The
aggregate, rather than the individual, utility often reflects the state's
interest. Parties may also withhold information relevant to the jury's
evaluation of their evidence if it contains uncertain implications for
their side.' 25  Finally, parties often have no significant interest in
reducing demands on the courts' decision-making resources, except to
the extent demands of repeated litigation might raise their own
transaction costs over the expected gains from litigation. Moreover,
parties have no interest in helping other parties use resources effi-
ciently.
122. See Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 378 (cited in note 98). Judge Weinstein has claimed that
non-adversary procedures show that the hearsay rule is unnecessary. Weinstein, 46 Iowa L. Rev.
at 347-49 (cited in note 5). Non-adversary European systems, however, restrict factfinders'
reliance on hearsay. See, for example, Damaska, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 444-49 (cited in note 52).
Ludi v. Switzerland, 238 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20-21 (1992), a recent decision of the European
Court of Human Rights, seems to adopt a hearsay-confrontation rule for criminal bench trials.
123. Allen, 66 B.U. L. Rev. at 428 (cited in note 112); Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 378 (cited in
note 98).
124. Otherwise, incentive for parties to join in actions under F.R.C.P. 20 or to remain in
F.R.C.P. 23(b)(3) class actions would decrease. Of course, even if the amount were adequate, the
party simply could be negligent or lazy. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 258 (cited in note 73).
125. For example, in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948), a Jones Act plaintiff,
relying on res ipsa loquitur, failed to call the co-worker whose actions allegedly caused the
plaintiffs injury. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 264-65 (cited in note 73), and Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev.
at 917-18 (cited in note 55), discuss parties' reasons for preferring to offer hearsay rather than live
testimony. The possibility that allegations of spoliation would deter parties from making such
strategic choices is implausible at best. Siegel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 918-19. One might argue that a
party's opponent could gain a competitive advantage if that party offers evidence that does not
warrant the jury's effort to evaluate it or withholds useful evidence, by offsetting the adverse ef-
fect of these actions on factfinding by offering other, more useful, evidence. The opponent's
incentive or ability to do so, however, is limited in much the same way as the party's incentive to
offer the most useful evidence possible. See Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 265-69.
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Asymmetries in access to information may also prevent parties
from effectively exposing flaws in their opponents' evidence, particu-
larly when one party has fewer economic resources than its opponent
or the opponent relies on the witness's purported expertise. 126
Although one cannot know either the value of evidence or the
appropriate inferential path to take in resolving an issue a priori, 127
jurors should not be free to shape the .factfinding process as they
choose.128 Respect for jurors' subjective weighing of evidence is consis-
tent with rules of exclusion. Assuming the jury is aware that the
judge knows more about the precise issues and their interrelations
than do the jurors, exclusions of evidence may be necessary to avoid
likely misunderstandings.129 Exclusions of evidence do not necessarily
preclude subsequent juror requests for more, or other, evidence. Court
martial procedure, for example, allows the factfinders to ask ques-
tions, subject to submission of the questions to the military judge for a
ruling on their propriety or revision of the question.1 30 Recognizing
that'there is no a priori correct problem-solving strategy for a particu-
lar problem does not entail a concession that one cannot distinguish
among the likely efficacy of approaches. In fact, given humans' lim-
ited mental capacity, continued survival of the species implies some
ability to assess the likely efficacy of inferential strategies.131 Judicial
exclusions of evidence need not rest on the conclusion that the prof-
fered evidence is forever useless. Judges instead should only exclude
evidence when the proffering party cannot make an adequate argu-
ment for its receipt at the particular time it is offered.132 Its exclusion
therefore neither labels the evidence forever irrelevant nor precludes
the party from establishing an adequate predicate for later admission
of the information after other evidence or argument.1 33 The judge thus
126. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 234 (cited in note 73); Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 923-24 (cited
in note 55). Admitting hearsay can weaken the opponent's ability to oppose the proferring party's
evidence if the speaker is not available for cross-examination, or if information about the
speaker's compliance with the conventions of communication is absent. See, for example, Swift,
75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1370-71 (cited in note 5).
127. Wigmore, 1A Evidence § 37.7 (cited in note 67).
128. See, for example, Allen, 66 B.U. L. Rev. at 428-31 (cited in note 112).
129. See notes 87-97 and accompanying text. While the text primarily addresses jury trials,
mistaken reliance on evidence could lead to a reversal in a bench trial as well.
130. M.R.E. 614(b), Executive Order 12,473,49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (1984).
131. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
132. See, for example, F.R.E. 104(b) (allowing admission subject to fulfillment of conditions of
fact, or further proof supporting the inference for which the evidence is proffered). See also
Glenn Shafer, The Construction of Probability Arguments, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 799, 802 (1986)
(arguing that probability analysis of evidence "must be treated as just another argument').
133. Of course, the parties have incentives to avoid these problems themselves. However,
the court has at least two independent interests in avoiding these problems. First, substantive
rules coupled with evidentiary rules set some minimal criteria for state intervention. See Callen,
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cannot exclude evidence merely because she disagrees with the con-
clusion it supports, or because as a factfinder, she might not credit the
evidence.
IV. HEARSAY: INFERENCE IN EVALUATING COMMUNICATION AND
LANGUAGE
A. Grice and the Hearsay Problem
Analyzing rules of evidence according to Grice's maxims not
only shows why courts should exclude irrelevant evidence, but also
provides an idea critical to any understanding of hearsay: our under-
standing of language and communication is an inferential process
based on implicit conventions. Return to the example introduced in
Part II about Reporter, who made a possibly ironic statement about a
forensics officer's handling of a shell casing. Reporter, the speaker,13 4
said to the forensics officer, 'Tup. Way to go, Daryl, way to handle the
shell casing flawlessly."' 5 To understand what Reporter meant to
convey, Daryl (or a juror) must make inferences about the behavior to
which 'Way to go" referred 36 and what Reporter meant by the term
"flawlessly." Then the juror must infer Reporter's goals:137 the
65 Tulane L. Rev. at 482-84 (cited in note 118); Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 231, 296 (cited in note
73). Second, to the extent factfinding follows predictable standards, persons likely will alter their
conduct to conform to legal rules because that alteration will produce a predictably better result.
See Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic Theory of Li-
ability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 137, 145-47, 157 (1987).
134. For brevity and simplicity, the Article generally refers to the actor whose communi-
cative conduct is under consideration as the speaker, and the observer of the conduct as the
hearer.
135. Admittedly, this is a fairly ambiguous statement. For a discussion of the importance of
contextual inference in discerning meaning and value in any case, see, for example, James L.
McClelland and Alan H. Kawamoto, Mechanisms of Sentence Processing: Assigning Rules to
Constituents of Sentences, in James L. McClelland, et al., eds., 2 Parallel Distributed Processing:
Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition 272, 272-77, 302-10, 315-16 (M.I.T., 1986);
Johnson-Laird, Mental Models at 232-41 (cited in note 76). Compare Wigmore, 1A Evidence § 37.7
at 1079.80 (cited in note 67) (noting the importance of context in deciding the content of a
statement with a missing term).
136. Consider the statement, 'This sentence is false." It is nonsense if taken by itself. See,
for example, Lea Brilmayer, Second-Order Evidence and Bayesian Logic, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 673, 689
(1986) (discussing the logical order of propositions). If that statement were made while the
declarant pointed at a sign reading, "Richard Nixon was the first president of the United States,"
however, the statement would become comprehensible. In more typical cases, one would infer
that only the default assumption about the meaning of the statement applied. See, for example,
Johnson-Laird, Mental Models at 127.30 (cited in note 76).
137. See Sperbr and Wilson, Relevance Communication and Cognition at 58-61 (cited in
note 37). For clarity, this Article substitutes "goal" for Sperber and Wilson's "intention."
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assumption 13 8 or assumptions that Reporter meant Daryl to make 13 as
a result'4° of the statement. Reporter may have intended Daryl to
share her view of events, whether favorable or unfavorable. The
jurors could only infer Reporter's opinion from the circumstances in
which she made the statement and the words she used, such as
"flawlessly." Jurors, and Daryl, could not understand Reporter
accurately without implicit reliance on the maxims of communica-
tion.14 1
To evaluate the statement fully, jurors must make inferences
about Reporter's goals. Those goals result, in turn, from Reporter's
beliefs about events, her motivation with regard to those events, and
her beliefs about Daryrs interests.'4 Jurors must infer Reporter's
goals to select phenomena to which -Reporter's statement could refer,
and to discern whether Reporter's opinion was favorable or unfavor-
able. In communicating, Reporter necessarily would intend to war-
rant the communication's usefulness. Unless Daryl perceived Re-
porter's implicit claim of compliance with the maxims of co-opera-
tion1-that the statement's usefulness to Daryl warranted the effort
138. The Article uses "assumption" to refer to the hearer's state of mind concerning a fact at
issue, or data that tend to prove or disprove that fact. It includes, among others, beliefs,
intentions, guesses, and surmises.
139. Or perhaps assumptions Reporter meant Daryl to hold more strongly. Thus, Reporter
might have believed that Daryl agreed the evidence gathering was not flawless, but intended the
communication to reinforce that assumption as a form of teasing. This possibility might show that
Reporter sought to convey another assumption, such as that Daryl was insufficiently humble.
One might contend that the utterance only assumed the evidence handling was flawed, and
did not intend to convey it. See note 42. Even if one agrees that Reporter simply assumed Daryl
knew that she erred, if Reporter specifically referred to flaws of which Daryl was fully aware, the
reference would violate Grice's maxims by wasting effort on an obvious proposition. See notes 79-
80 and accompanying text. Reporter, if complying with Grice's maxims, therefore would intend to
communicate to Daryl that she erred, that Daryl did not take her own error sufficiently seriously,
or perhaps, with humor, that the error was minor. The first is certainly hearsay. If one argues
that Reporter's statement could be construed only as an intent to inform Daryl that Daryl was too
casual about an error that they agreed occurred, one must first avoid the pitfalls an a priori
construction creates, including the possibility that Reporter might be trying to show Daryl that
the error was trivial. For alternative constructions of Reporter's utterance, see notes 37-38 and
accompanying text. These traps weaken an argument that insists specific intent, rather than
general intent, should determine what a communication asserts. For a discussion of that
argument, see note 190.
140. These propositions are known as "implicatures" in linguistics and cognitive science.
See, for example, Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 35 (cited in
note 37).
141. See notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
142. Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 160-61 (cited in note
37). Schum, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. at 62 (cited in note 22), concludes that the probative force of
hearsay depends on the completeness of the evidence regarding the inferential risks that a piece
of hearsay presents.
143. Sperber and Wilson refer to this implicit claim as the "presumption" or 'guarantee" of
"relevance." Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 156-63 (cited in
HEARSAY AND INFORMAL REASONING
needed to comprehend it-Daryl would ignore the communication.
Daryl could then devote her cognitive resources to goals other than
Reporter's goals. Similarly, if Reporter thought Daryl would be un-
willing to rely on Reporter's implicit claim of co-operation, she would
have had no reason to communicate.
Of course, for the jurors to decide whether to alter their view of
the facts in accord with Reporter's communication, they must deter-
mine whether Reporter's goals conflicted with Daryl's interest and
whether Reporter's implicit claim of co-operation is accurate. 144 Once
the jurors realize that Reporter intended to communicate, the inferen-
ces necessary to evaluate the communication give rise to Professor
Morgan's four inferential dangers of hearsay: honesty or sincerity,
verbal ability, perceptive ability, and, when necessary, memory.145
The difference between the process in Grice's view and the process as
Morgan understood it is two-fold: First, inferences about Reporter's
implicit claim of co-operation and Reporter's goals are the aspects of
comprehension and evaluation of the communication that create the
true risks with respect to Morgan's four dangers.'4 Second, the
communication necessarily incorporates the implicit claim of co-
operation-the words and actions in a communication do not stand
alone. Without inferences or assumptions based on the speaker's
implicit claim of co-operation, evaluation of the probative value of the
declarant's words or actions is futile.
The implicit claim of co-operation alters Morgan's depiction of
inference from out-of-court behavior. In deciding whether to make or
strengthen an assumption as a result of Reporter's communication,
jurors must evaluate the speaker's honesty or sincerity,4 7 verbal
note 37). This Article has changed the phrase because use of "presumptions* and "relevance" in
this sense seems confusing in a discussion of evidence law.
144. Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 30 (cited in note 51), claims that a speaker who
violates one or more of the madms is "liable to mislead.'
145. Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 178-79 (cited in note 5).
146. A similar idea may underlie the Advisory Committee's comment that the hearsay
dangers of nonverbal conduct not intended as an assertion 'are minimal in the absence of an
intent to assert.' F.R.E. 801(a) Advisory Committee's Note. While there may be no risk of
insincerity in the absence of an intent to assert, there is no reason to conclude that the lack of an
intention makes the conduct less ambiguous or lessens the likelihood that the actor mistakenly
remembered or perceived information, Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 745 (cited in note 36),
unless those risks are essentially risks of inference from the implicit claim of co-operation. Non-
communicative conduct does not make the implicit claim and, thus, could not create risks of
inference from it.
147. This factor is significant at least where honesty can be differentiated from the speaker's
motivation, which might already have been considered in evaluating the speaker's intention in
making the statement.
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ability,14 perceptive ability, and memory.149  Morgan correctly
identified these as four major risks in making any inference from
communications. His account does not, however, treat them more
precisely as risks of inference from and about the speaker's goals and
her implicit claim of co-operation. Unless jurors have the information
necessary to make judgments about the speaker's possible goals and
to assess the basis for her implicit assurance that the communication
would be useful for the hearer, they might be unable to reduce the
alternative possible contents of the communication to a manageable
number. 15° A hearer confronted with a communication containing a
multitude of possible meanings essentially cannot evaluate the
speaker's honesty or sincerity1 51 in communicating or her ability to
remember or perceive the contents of that communication. Moreover,
the hearer cannot determine whether the speaker meant to be ironic
without making inferences about the speaker's goals, even if the
communication has only a tolerable amount of vagueness-in Mor-
gan's theory, irony is an instance of the sincerity danger.152 In other
words, cleanly isolating one danger from the others is impossible, as is
eliminating implicit conventions from communication.
One might consider ambiguity in a communication obvious-so
obvious that the factfinder would know that inferring from the com-
munication a fact at issue is risky regardless of the role that the
148. Verbal ability is sometimes referred to as the speaker's narration or the statement's
ambiguity. If honesty-sincerity and verbal ability are taken in sum, they raise the issue of
whether the description of the speaker's beliefs as conveyed by the communication is accurate.
The factors are often grouped together, in the terminology of Tribe's triangulation of hearsay, as
the left-leg dangers. Laurence H. Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 957, 959 (1974).
149. Perception and memory together raise the question of whether the declarant's beliefs
are likely to be correct. Under Tribe's terminology, they are known as the right-leg dangers. Id.
150. An inferential strategy such as Grice's maxims is indispensable in evaluating hearsay, a
task which otherwise would result in a combinatorial explosion. See Schum, 14 Cardozo L. Rev.
at 43-47 (cited in note 22). The computational complexity would be even greater in multiple
hearsay. Richard D. Friedman, Infinite Strands, Infinitesimally Thin: Storytelling, Bayesianism,
Hearsay and Other Evidence, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 79, 79 n.3 (1992).
Information showing that the statement is useful often will be part of the proffer, such as with
a present sense impression. F.R.E. 803(1). A system of standards nevertheless is very useful for
decisionmaking when the proffering party cannot, or chooses not to, supply such information. See
notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
151. The Advisory Committee's Note to Article viii of the Federal Rules chiefly concerns the
risk of insincerity. For the text of the note, see note 176. See also Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1797
(cited in note 98). The dangers are entangled, however-an attempt to analyze one necessarily
concerns the others. Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 384-85 & n.55 (cited in note 5); Schum, 14
Cardozo L. Rev. at 59 (cited in note 22). Tmwinkelried, 41 Fla. L. Rev. at 218, 223-28 (cited in note
40), reports psychological research revealing that potential inaccuracies in the witness's memory
are "a far more important cause of testimonial error than subjective insincerity.' Compare Rice,
65 Temple L. Rev. at 532 (cited in note 8) (explaining that "because speech is almost always
intended as an assertion of something to someone, it always carries with it the inherent danger of
insincerity").
152. See, for example, Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 534 (cited in note 8).
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speaker's implicit claim of co-operation plays in the communicative
process.15 While deciding to exclude utter gibberish may be easy,1 5
the dangers of ambiguity do not disappear when inferential tasks
become more subtle. The dangers of ambiguity present more than a
trivial reiteration of a baseline relevance test under Federal Rule of
Evidence 401 in situations in which no reasonable person could ever
decide what the speaker meant to convey. Ambiguity instead inter-
twines with problems of inferring the speaker's goals and accuracy.
For example, suppose a salesperson's statement, "I'm sure that this
Amalgamated Motors Zoomer is defect free," is offered to show the
car's condition when it left the showroom immediately before an acci-
dent. The word "sure" can cover numerous bases for the salesperson's
professed opinion of the car, including the salesperson's thorough and
competent examination of the car immediately preceding the state-
ment. Some possible meanings may involve elevated risks of memory,
perception, or sincerity; others may not. Difficulties of ambiguity,
vagueness, or narration are not independent of other hearsay risks.
Some courts and commentators rely on the dangers analysis in
claiming that admission of implied assertions (the contents of commu-
nication inferred from the implicit claim of co-operation) creates fewer
inferential risks than would admission of express assertions (words or
actions standing alone).15 Empirical research, however, shows that it
is actually a more difficult inferential task for a hearer to decide
whether the speaker believed a possible implication than for the
hearer to decide whether the speaker believed a logically or practically
necessary implication.15 The empirical evidence therefore contradicts
arguments that treat the use of implicit conventions as a less tricky
inferential problem than typical inference from communications. 157
153. See, for example, Tribe, 87 Harv. L. Rev. at 969 n.42 (cited in note 148).
154. Excluding communications in which the speaker obviously suffered from a lack of
memory or perception, or in which the speaker was obviously joking, would be similarly easy. It
is doubtful that occasional obvious cases of ambiguity distinguish it from other dangers.
155. See, for example, United States v. Short, 790 F.2d 464, 467 (6th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464, 467-68 (E.D. Ky. 1980); Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern
Approach to Evidence at 367-68 (cited in note 38); Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 685 n.12 (cited in
note 28).
156. Gibbs, Contextual Effects at 10 (cited in note 77).
157. See Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence 197-98 (Oxford U., 1989)
(warning that the dangers of reliance on express assertion are 'equally present when we are
asked to infer the same fact" from an implied assertion).
Professor Rice has a different, but certainly telling, response to claims that implied assertions
are necessarily less dangerous evidence than express assertions. He argues that whenever the
speaker is engaged in a communicative act, Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 536 (cited in note 8), the
act "carries with it the inherent danger of insincerity." Id. at 532. "As a chain can be no stronger
than its weakest link," implied assertions can be no less dangerous than the communications that
imply them. Id. at 538. The difference between the co-operative theory and Professor Rice's
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Realizing that the act of communication includes more than
literal declaration and that Morgan's dangers test does not provide a
complete map of the inferential risks hearsay evidence presents is
critical to understanding the relationship between hearsay doctrine
and informal reasoning. In light of co-operative theory, the Article
now more precisely develops and articulates the distinction between
hearsay and nonhearsay.
B. Functional Distinctions Between Hearsay and Nonhearsay
Understanding the inferential process necessary to evaluate
communications simplifies distinctions between hearsay and nonhear-
say. First, substantive law often makes statements nonhearsay. The
statements are nonhearsay not because of a perception that such
statements are always honest and accurate, or because they fail to
assert the proposition for which they are offered, but because the
factfinder has no significant1" need to ascertain the speaker's goal, or
to assess whether the speaker's implicit claim of co-operation is
accurate, before evaluating the communication for the purpose for
which it is offered.
In some cases, a communication must reflect a precise formula,
such as "I do" or "I will" in a wedding ceremony, to be nonhearsay. In
other cases, the communication need not adhere to a precise formula;
rather, it is nonhearsay because (i) it would be sufficient, under the
circumstances, to establish an element of a claim or defense, and (ii)
the accurate assessment of the speaker's implicit claim of co-operation
is not indispensable to determining the communication's probative
value for the purpose for which it is offered.
theory lies chiefly in Professor Rice's willingness to circumscribe the scope of an assertion by the
matters the assertion conveys verbatim, id. at 532, and in his focus on reliability as a justification
of the hearsay rule. Contrast notes 173-88 and accompanying text (scope of assertion); notes 101-
106, 229-31, and accompanying text (reliability). Setting aside those differences, Professor Rice
clearly believes that the literalist approach is unsound, see Rice, 65 Temple L. Rev. at 532, and
suggests a construction that might yield the same results as the co-operative approach-namely,
reading the phrase "if it is intended by the person as an assertion" at the end of Federal Rule
801(a) to refer only to the reference to "nonverbal conduct of a person" that immediately precedes
it in Rule 801(a)(2). Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 764 (cited in note 36), advocates the same
construction.
Classifying implied assertions as nonhearsay creates a narration problem of its
own--sophisticated (and somewhat unscrupulous) witnesses would simply reword hearsay
statements merely to imply a proposition that the proffering party wished to show, making the
statement nonhearsay to prove the proposition. Park v. Huff, 493 F.2d 923, 927-28 (5th Cir. 1974),
withdrawn on other grounds, 506 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
158. The Article uses the term 'significant here because the factfinder must be able to
conclude that the hearer could have understood the statement to refer to something in issue.
This conclusion would involve a minimal judgment about the speaker's implicit claim: that the
hearer could have thought that the communication warranted his attention.
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Smedra v. Stanek 59 illustrates the distinction between the
inadmissibility of a statement for a hearsay purpose and the admissi-
bility of the same statement when substantive law would encourage
further action 60 based on it. The plaintiff brought an action against a
surgeon alleging that the surgeon failed to remove a surgical sponge
from her body before closing the incision.'6 1  The plaintiff offered a
witness who would testify that before the surgeon closed the incision,
someone said, "The sponge count did not come out right."' 62 The court
held that the witness's statement was not hearsay to show that the
surgeon had reason to recheck the site of the operation for a sponge. 63
In cases such as Smedra, in which a statement is offered to show
notice or warning, the substantive law treats the statement as non-
hearsay evidence that the hearer had notice of a possible defect or
danger. In the absence of information showing that the warning was
inaccurate or that the hearer was entitled to conclude that the state-
ment did not refer to the relevant risk, the underlying rule required
the hearer to attempt to determine whether danger existed.' 64 Accord-
ingly, without evidence that either contradicted the statement about
the sponge count or showed that the hearer knew the statement did
not convey any risk, the jury should be entitled to rely on the state-
ment to find that the surgeon had notice of possible danger. 165 The
statement, therefore, is nonhearsay.
The Smedra court, however; noted the statement's inadmissi-
bility to show that the surgeon actually had closed the incision with-
159. 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951). For a discussion of the role that the negligence standard
plays in structuring actors' out-of-court decision-making strategies, see Cherniak, Minimal
Rationality at 100-07 (cited in note 58).
160. Such action would include the hearer's reconsideration of evidence available to the
hearer at the time of the communication.
161. Smedra, 187 F.2d at892.
162. Id. at 893.
163. Id. at 894.
164. Id. See Cherniak, Minimal Rationality at 100-07 (cited in note 58).
165. Numerous scholars have discussed the status of performative statements, or statements
that in themselves perform a function and seemingly cannot be true or false. Examples include
naming a ship, or the utterance, "I apologize." See, for example, Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 416-
22 (cited in note 5); Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 447 n.77 (cited in note 8); Weissenberger, 65 Temple
L. Rev. at 861.62 (cited in note 8). The term "performative" comes from J.L. Austin, How to Do
Things With Words 6 (Oxford U., J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa, eds., 2d ed. 1975). Performative
statements often are nonhearsay as a matter of substantive law. Performative statements also
may be nonhearsay as a matter of social convention, rather than as an implication of substantive
law, that is, nonhearsay because the speaker's goal and implicit claim of co-operation are not
significant in determining the statements' probative value. On the other hand, the performative
statement, "I congratulate you on your performance," id. at 40, should be hearsay if offered to
show that the performance was good.
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out removing a sponge. 166 For that purpose, an assessment of the
speaker's implicit claim would be necessary. The speaker could have
intended to upbraid someone else because the records showed a count
that was too high. In addition, the sources on which she relied in
making her statement may have been inaccurate, or she may have
misinterpreted them. Finally, the unknown identity of the speaker
compounded the difficulty of assesssing her implicit claim.
Another statement that substantive law classifies as nonhear-
say, "I agree to this contract," is offered to show formation of a con-
tract when an objective contract formation theory applies. In the
contract case, the substantive rule is designed to allow the hearer to
rely on the existence of a contract while devoting only minimal re-
sources to determining the speaker's intentions, for example, ensuring
that the speaker's statement is not a joke if the context indicated it
might be one. The statement, therefore, should be sufficient to sup-
port a finding that the utterer agreed to the contract, in the absence of
conflicting or undermining evidence.
A second, closely related class is composed of communications
that the substantive law considers nonhearsay because hearers might
take some action based upon them. Defamatory statements, on which
hearers might rely in changing, terminating, or avoiding relationships
with the subjects of the statements, are one example of this class. 16
Threats made through words or conduct, offered to show that the
recipient had reason to be fearful, are another. 6
A final class of nonhearsay does not result from substantive
law. This class includes communications offered to show a
proposition, when the communication's probative value for that
166. Smedra, 187 F.2d at 894. Holding the statement hearsay for one purpose and
nonhearsay for another raises the question of the extent to which juries will follow limiting
instructions. The issue is beyond the scope of this Article, except to note that despite arguments
to the contrary, some empirical evidence reveals that jurors seem to comply with limiting instruc-
tions. See Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod, and Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury 231-32
(Harvard U., 1983). See also Peter Miene, Roger C. Park, and Eugene Borgida, Juror Decision
Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683, 695-96 (1992). Professor
Nance offers an interesting theory of the role of limiting instructions: the instruction notes that
while the evidence is admissible on issue A, the party offered less than optimal evidence on issue
B, which the court does not condone. He also notes that F.R.E. 105, Advisory Committee's Note,
allows the judge to exclude the evidence when even the most conscientious juror, with a limiting
instruction, could not ignore the improper inference. Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 293 & n.313 (cited
in note 73). See also Michael L. Seigel, A Pragmatic Critique of Modern Evidence Scholarship, 88
-Nw. U. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming 1994) (manuscript at 50-51, on file with the Author) (defending
limiting instructions as efforts to maintain the integrity of the trial process, regardless of their
effect on jury deliberations).
167. See, for example, W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 112 at
791-92 (West, 5th ed. 1984).
168. See, for example, United States v. William, 993 F.2d 451, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1993).
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proposition does not depend on the speaker's goal or implicit claims
about the communication. Suppose that the plaintiff in a wrongful
death case offered the testimony of a highway patrol officer who heard
the person behind the wheel of a wrecked car say, "I'm alive." The
plaintiff offers the statement to show that the driver survived the
accident. The evidence is admissible because its probative value does
not depend on the speaker's goals or implicit assurances-if the
speaker could speak, the speaker would necessarily be alive.
In contrast, whenever a proponent offers a communication for a
hearsay purpose, information concerning the speaker's goal or implicit
claims about the communication is important for the factfinder's
evaluation of the statement's probative value. 69 The exceptions to the
current hearsay rule may not supply this data most effectively, yet
they generally require the proffering party to provide information
about the speaker's goal, implicit assurance, or both.170 Moreover, if
judges received hearsay without such a foundation, the jury might
erroneously believe that the court endorsed the evidence. 17  The more
complete the relevant data that accompany a piece of possibly useful
169. For discussions of the role of hearsay rules in promoting the factfinder's ability to
evaluate out-of-court statements, see, for example, Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 282-84 (cited in note
73); Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 896-97 (cited in note 55); Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1354-61 (cited in
note 5); Mary Morton, Note, The Hearsay Rule as Epistemological Suicide, 74 Georgetown L. J.
1301, 1307-11 (1986).
170. See notes 232-41 and accompanying text. The exclusions from the hearsay rule
essentially operate to provide the jury with more information to use in evaluating the prior
consistent or inconsistent communications of testifying witnesses, F.R.E. 801(d)(1), or to force
parties likely to control evidence bearing on evaluation of their own or their agents' statements to
do so. F.R.E. 801(d)(2). Each exclusion maximizes the likelihood of offers of explanation,
refutation, or contextualization (with the possible exception of co-conspirator's statements and
statements of former agents offered against the former principal) and thus facilitates assessment
of the speaker's implicit claim of co-operation. See Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 385-86 (cited in
note 5).
171. See notes 87-97 and accompanying text. The jury would infer that the court, having
already screened the evidence itself, did not provide them with further data because the data
were irrelevant. When a court receives hearsay, "it becomes important to determine to what
extent the reception of the data under conditions which do not satisfy the usual protective tests
will serve to accomplish the objectives of the trial and yet not expose the trier to appreciable
danger of being misled." Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 185 (cited in note 5).
F.R.E. 104(a) technically would permit the proffering party to offer data to satisfy the
conditions of the exceptions solely in the jury's absence, although this procedure is rare, to say the
least, and would only affect the supply of data for evaluation of statements in a jury trial. Even if
the proffering party chose to follow this procedure, it would have an incentive to repeat much of
the information before the jury to keep the narrative of events complete, to increase the effect of
its evidence, or both. Moreover, proving an exception in the jury's absence would provide the op-
posing party or the judge with information on which to premise further examination of the
witness and counter-argument in the opponent's case. Further examination or counter-argument
would provide information helpful to the jury's evaluation of the evidence. If no one chose to
engage in further questioning or counter-argument, the jury could make the essentially accurate
assumption that the courts and the opponents, despite adequate opportunity to do so, did not
challenge the evidence.
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evidence, the less likely the jury will mistakenly conclude that the
court has already decided the evidence is inherently reliable. Finally,
to the extent courts receive communications that do not seem to jus-
tify the effort to evaluate them, jurors may ignore the presentations at
trial and decide facts based on pre-existing extrinsic assumptions.112
C. Interpreting Federal Rule 801 with the Co-operative Theory
The approach to distinguishing hearsay from nonhearsay that
this Article advocates, called the co-operative theory after Grice's
maxims, fits the language of the Federal Rules at least as well as its
competitors. The authors of McCormick on Evidence, as well as oth-
ers, 173 staunchly maintain that the Advisory Committee that drafted
the Federal Rules of Evidence intended to classify implied assertions
(such as the communication about the shell casing in the initial hypo-
thetical) as nonhearsay. These authors argue that a statement does
not assert implied assertions.1 74  No coherent intepretation of the
language of the Rules and comments supports their argument, how-
ever, which indicates that Congress did not intend to enact the literal-
ist heuristic when it adopted the Rules.175  If anything, reliance on
Grice's maxims as an interpretative guide imputes to Congress a
plausible, consistent intent in its enactment of Rule 801.
The Federal Rules themselves do not define the term
"assertion." The Committee's note to Federal Rule 801(a) 76 offers
these guideposts:
172. See note 85 and accompanying text. See also Bergman, 75 Ky. L. J. at 861-63 (cited in
note 9) (explaining that humans augment information communicated to them by adding details
from their own experience).
173. See, for example, Weissenberger, 64 Temple L. Rev. at 146-52 (cited in note 40).
174. See note 31 and accompanying text.
175. Scholars generally agree that the Advisory Committee intended to encourage use of the
literalist heuristic. See, for example, Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.7 at 714 (cited
in note 88). However, many doubt that the Committee's language accomplished that end. In any
event, "there is nothing in the legislative history to indicate that Congress affirmatively acqui-
esced in the Advisory Committee's conclusion that [implied assertions from communicative
conduct] should be treated as nonhearsay." Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 758 (cited in note
36) (footnote omitted).
176. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note, provides:
The definition of "statement" assumes importance because the term is used in the
definition of hearsay in subdivision (c). The effect of the definition of 'statement" is to
exclude from the operation of the hearsay rule all evidence of conduct, verbal or
nonverbal, not intended as an assertion. The key to the definition is that nothing is an
assertion unless intended to be one.
It can scarcely be doubted that an assertion made in words is intended by the de.
clararant to be an assertion. Hence verbal assertions readily fall into the category of
.statement." Whether nonverbal conduct should be regarded as a statement for purposes
of defining hearsay requires further consideration. Some nonverbal conduct, such as the
act of pointing to identify a suspect in a lineup, is clearly the equivalent of words, asser-
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(i) The definition of statement'17  excludes "all
evidence of conduct, verbal or nonverbal, not intended as an
assertion."7 8
(ii) No action should be considered an assertion
"unless intended to be one."'1 9
(iii) "[A]n assertion made in words is intended by the
declarant to be an assertion."' se
(iv) "[Nionassertive verbal conduct [or] verbal
conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for asserting
something other than the matter asserted" is excluded from
hearsay' 8l under 801(c), which itself says that to be hearsay, a
statement must be "offered in evidence to prove the matter as-
serted."182
(v) If "evidence of conduct is offered on the theory
that it is not a statement, and hence not hearsay, a
preliminary determination will be required to determine
whether an assertion is [sic] intended."''
tive in nature, and to be regarded as a statement. Other nonverbal conduct, however,
may be offered as evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the ex-
istence of the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condi-
tion may be inferred. This sequence is, arguably, in effect an assertion of the existence of
the condition and hence properly includable within the hearsay concept. [Citations omit-
ted.] Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with respect to the perception,
memory, and narration (or their equivalents) of the actor, but the Advisory Committee is
of the view that these dangers are minimal in the absence of an intent to assert and do notjustify the loss of the evidence on hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of the
possibility of fabrication, but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive ver-
bal conduct. The situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to
eliminate questions of sincerity. Motivation, the nature of the conduct, and the presence
or absence of reliance will bear heavily upon the weight to be given the evidence.[Citation omitted.] Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal conduct and verbal
conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the
matter asserted, also excluded from the definition of hearsay by the language of subdivi-
sion (c).
When evidence of conduct is offered on the theory that it is not a statement, and
hence not hearsay, a preliminary determination will be required to determine whether an
assertion is intended. The rule is so worded as to place the burden upon the party claim-
ing that the intention existed; ambiguous and doubtful cases will be resolved against him
and in favor of admissibility. The determination involves no greater difficulty than many
other preliminary questions of fact. [Citations omitted.]
177. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. Points (ii) and (iii), of course, commit the classic lexicographer's sin of defining a
term with reference to itself.
181. Id. One could point out, as Professor Seidelson has, that the phrase 'the matter
asserted* could refer to matters implicitly asserted. Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 759 (cited
in note 36). That argument is essentially a variant of the argument in the text of this Article.
182. F.R.E. 801(c).
183. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note.
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The comment's language is difficult to apply coherently without
employing some form of co-operative analysis. Consider, for example,
the statement with which this Article began, 'Yup. Way to go Daryl,
way to handle the shell casing flawlessly." Under (iii), Reporter's
statement would be "an assertion," that is, intended to assert
something. Otherwise (iii) would be meaningless, merely stating that
an assertion is an assertion. By negative implication, if under (ii)
those things that are intended as assertions should be treated as
"assertion[s]," one must treat Reporter's utterance as a statement
under (i). Similarly, (v) would only require the prosecutor to prove
Reporter intended an assertion if it appeared she did not intend an
assertion-which (iii) resolves in favor of treating Reporter's utterance
as an assertion.
The categories referred to in (iv) provide the pigeonholes in
which the Committee probably intended to place communications
offered to prove implied assertions. In light of the Committee's own
comment, however, Reporter's utterance would be an assertion, which
appears to bring it under the hearsay rule, unless one can show that
Reporter did not intend to assert the proposition for which the
statement is offered. The defense could best argue that (iii) implies
that a speaker only intends to assert the propositions that the speaker
puts into words. The comment does not appear to lend itself to that
construction, however; after stating that an "assertion made in words"
is intended as an assertion, it goes on to discuss nonverbal conduct
that may be an assertion, indicating that verbalization is not neces-
sary. Moreover, the argument that Reporter did not intend to criticize
Daryl would be inconsistent with the defense's theory.
The literalist theory's construction of (iii) poses a major prob-
lem--communicators intend their communicative behavior to convey
the fact that they are employing the implicit conventions of
communication. That intention may not be uppermost in their minds,
but they certainly expect their hearers to rely on the conventions. If,
for instance, a law partner giving an associate a research assignment
were to use a metaphor such as "leave no stone unturned," the partner
would expect the associate to understand that she was giving
directions about the degree of thoroughness with which she expected
the associate to research, rather than conveying advice about rock
inversion. Accordingly, the communicator's intention,&I combined
with the act of communication, makes that act assertive of the
communicator's compliance with the communicative conventions, in
184. Id.
[Vol. 47:43
HEARSAY AND INFORMAL REASONING
addition to the matters that may be the direct focus of any
communication. ' "
To put it differently, if the literalist theory's construction of ('i)
applies to verbal conduct only, it conflicts with other comment lan-
guage referring to nonverbal conduct that may be hearsay. If Re-
porter behaved in a way that indicated she believed Daryl erred, and
the defense offered that action to show that Daryl did so, the action
would be hearsay if intended as "the equivalent of words."l A verbal
communication conveys ideas in "the equivalent of words" that it does
not articulate.1 8 Adopting the literalist theory's construction of the
comment would classify verbal conduct as nonhearsay to convey those
ideas, even though nonverbal conduct that intended to convey the
same ideas would be hearsay. It is clear that the Committee
considered the dangers of drawing inferences from nonverbal conduct
minimal in the absence of "an intent to assert."188 If anything, the
Committee intended to make nonverbal conduct less subject to the
hearsay rule than verbal conduct. The literalist heuristic contradicts
that intent.
Rather than adhere to a requirement that a statement directly
articulate a proposition in order to assert it, supporters of the literalist
heuristic might say that intent is critical, and that if Reporter in-
tended to be ironic, then her statement asserts criticism of Daryl's
handling of the shell casing. If the supporters use such analysis often,
literalist analysis would hold that a communication would only assert
185. Wellborn, who is critical of general intent tests, nevertheless nears this point when he
notes, "If the expression is one that would support an inference of belief, normally the speaker or
writer would have been aware at least of the possibility of such an inference, and therefore the
possibility that he intended it would also exist." Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 67 (cited in note 17).
Wellborn states that such a possibility "must be regarded as far more significant in the ordinary
case of apparently non-assertive words" than in that of nonverbal conduct. Id. See also note 196
and accompanying text.
186. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note. See note 176.
187. Interpretation of the Committee's note poses two other problems. First, if courts apply
some sort of "explicitness" or "literalness" criterion in deciding whether a statement asserts a
proposition, implications from verbal behavior are nonhearsay, while implications from conduct
are hearsay. An advocate of this distinction might say that nonverbal conduct can be
misunderstood more easily; accordingly, the court should be more careful in admitting nonverbal
assertions. Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 682-91 (cited in note 28). That distinction, however,
would rest on the assumption that one can understand language without considering the author's
intention or state of mind, while the actor's reason for engaging in a physical act is much more
uncertain. That assumption would be controversial at best. See note 217 and accompanying text.
Second, treating assertions implied from communicative conduct as unasserted, in accordance
with the note, makes them "similar" to nonassertive nonverbal conduct, as to which the note
claims the hearsay risks are "minimal in the absence of an intent to assert." F.R.E. 801(a),
Advisory Committee's Note. That conclusion is implausible when one considers the dangers of
perception, sincerity, narration, and memory that evaluating propositions implied in
communications poses. Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 756 (cited in note 36).
188. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note. See note 176.
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the propositions it directly articulated in words, except when the
speaker might have intended irony or metaphor, in which case the
assertion would encompass the speaker's intended message-an ap-
proach with extremely uncertain applications. No inference that a
speaker intended to use irony or metaphor could rely exclusively on
words. Assertions would not include contents based on the implicit
conventions of communication because, although intended, those
contents are not conveyed in words. This variation of the literalist
heuristic thus enables one to use evidence other than words to infer
that an ironic or metaphoric statement was part of the
communication, but otherwise forbids reliance on the implicit
conventions necessary to a communication to determine its content.
The speaker, however, certainly intends to rely on the implicit
conventions, and expects her hearer to do so as well.
D. A Co-operative Restatement of the Definition of Hearsay
Adherents of the conventional views doubtless will maintain
that cognitive theory cannot articulate a distinction between hearsay
and nonhearsay any clearer than those distinctions drawn by
conventional theories. A distinction between hearsay and nonhearsay
based on Gricean analysis, however, is clearer than the literalist
theory's distinction, fits the language of the Rule, and conflicts with
the advisory comment as little as possible, given the confused nature
of that comment. First, under the theory offered here, an out-of-court
act can only be hearsay if it is communicative. Thus, the act in
question, and the context within which the actor did the act, must
indicate that the actor had a belief about a condition sought to be
proved. Second, the act and its context must indicate that the actor
generally intended to inform an audience of that belief.189 If the act
satisfies those two criteria, it is a communication. Finally, the
communication is hearsay (i) if the proponent offers it to establish any
inference that the actor generally would have intended9° the
189. Grice states that a communication must indicate a belief and the intent to communicate
that belief. See, for example, Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 103 (cited in note 51). The
actor, or declarant, may herself be the audience, as when she makes a record or diary for later
consultation, see F.R.E. 803(6), or when she talks to herself for any number of purposes: self-
encouragement, venting emotions, or examining how ideas sound-the oral equivalent of scratch
paper.
190. The use of general intent here is important for at least three reasons. First, attempting
to decide whether an actor, even in context, specifically or consciously intended to assert a
proposition essentially imposes a literalist construction on the communication, and suffers from
the same linguistic weaknesses. See notes 42 and 139. Paul S. Milich, Re-Examining Hearsay
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audience to draw from the communication, 191 and (ii) if assessment of
the degree of accuracy of the actor's implicit claim of co-operation
would be essential to a thoughtful, unprejudiced 192  factfinder's
determination of the inference's reliability.
In other words, according to the co-operative theory of hearsay,
the communication is an assertion of the propositions its author would
generally intend it to convey under the circumstances. It is offered for
Under the Federal Rules: Some Method for the Madness, 39 Kan. L. Rev. 893, 910-12 (1991),
provides the clearest example of a specific intent theory of communication for hearsay purposes.
Second, suppose one could be confident that an actor who engaged in such a communication
would be unlikely (to some threshold level of likelihood) to intend specifically to assert the
proposition for which the communication was offered. Even then, specific intent would be a poor
criterion. Distinguishing hearsay from nonhearsay in reliance on specific intent would presume
that no one could intend to deceive or mislead about proposition P if they did not consciously
endeavor to assert P. Thus, if one accepts the literalist theory that the risk of insincerity is
critical to deciding whether a communication is hearsay, see note 42, only the specifically
intended communication could be hearsay. Assuming that one can somehow isolate the sincerity
danger to make it determinative, however, is erroneous. See notes 147-54 and accompanying text.
Even if one could isolate the sincerity danger, the argument would be flawed because effective
deceivers often prefer to mislead by implication rather than by express false statement. See note
42.
Finally, the notion of intent supporting this standard would be very curious. If someone were
to drive a nail with a hammer, that would entail contracting his forearm muscles. Were a friend
to ask him afterwards if he intended to contract them, he might say he was not conscious of it,
even though he intended, in some sense, to do anything necessary to drive the nail. On the other
hand, suppose a bystander who saw him lining up the nail held out her hammer and said, "Here's
my hammer." If he asked her whether she meant to convey that the hammer would be useful, or
suitable, she likely would consider the question silly, because the intent to convey the hammer's
suitability, if not uppermost in her mind, is indispensable to the exchange. See notes 79-86 and
accompanying text. A particularly zealous dissenter might argue that the statement would not be
hearsay to show that the hammer was her property, on the theory that she assumed it was, and
only meant to convey that it would be proper for him to use the hammer. See Friedman, The
Elements of Evidence at 143 (cited in note 10). That construction would violate Grice's maxims,
however, by assuming that the word 'my" was surplusage and an unnecessary communication.
See notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
191. This view nearly parallels Morgan's understanding of the concept of an assertion.
"[Tihe word must be, and generally is, taken to include not only a combination of words but also
nonverbal conduct . . . which is offered as evidence of the truth of the matter intended, or
assumed by the proponent to have been intended, to be communicated." Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev.
at 216 (cited in note 5). A similar approach claims that "only conduct apparently intended to
convey thought can come under the ban of the hearsay rule." Seligman, 26 Harv. L. Rev. at 148
(cited in note 31). McCormick calls Morgan's approach "less helpful than his other writings,"
without giving any reasons. 2 McCormick 4th, § 246 at 98 n.5 (cited in note 8). That criticism
seems inconsistent with McCormick's (i) argument that the meaning of "assertion" in the Federal
Rules is clear, although undefined, and (ii) acknowledgement that the treatise relies on a
definition of the term it concedes is obsolete. Id. at 97-98 & n.5.
A proponent who argued that a communication C was nonhearsay might contend that, al-
though C was a communication, the actor's intent with respect to proposition P was so uncertain
that C should be nonhearsay to prove P. Assuming that C would not be sufficient for a thoughtful
judgment as to P without considering the actor's implicit claim, see notes 164-68 and accompany-
ing text, the argument is too clever by half. If the proponent cannot show circumstances in which
the actor did C such that a reasonable person would expect the audience to make or reinforce as-
sumptions about P as a result of the communication, see note 139, then C likely would be
irrelevant.
192. This requirement conforms the co-operative approach to F.R.E. 403.
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the truth of the matter asserted93 if the factfinder would need more
than minimal information about the nature and accuracy of the beliefs
the actor communicated to evaluate the degree to which the
communication proved the fact at issue. To illustrate the term
"minimal," recall the discussion of Smedra v. Stanek.194 The statement
about the sponge count was nonhearsay to show that the surgeon had
notice that a sponge might be in the patient when he closed the
incision. Only minimal information about the nature and accuracy of
the speaker's beliefs is necessary for that purpose-as long as it was
not obvious that the speaker's statement had no bearing on the
surgeon's conduct, the statement would be admissible to show a
warning. On the other hand, the statement would be hearsay to show
that a sponge was in fact in the patient when the surgeon closed
because knowledge about the accuracy and sources of the speaker's
beliefs about the sponges is necessary to a thoughtful evaluation of
the statement's probative value on that issue. 195
The Federal Rules and the comments are thus consistent with
treating a communication as hearsay when its proponent offers it to
show propositions that the speaker would generally intend19 the
hearer to infer from the communication. These propositions include
193. Thus, under the co-operative approach, false statements of third persons associated
with the party against whom the statements are offered are nonhearsay to show the third person
lied because she believed that the person against whom the evidence was offered was guilty or
liable. See Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 426 (cited in note 8). This use of the false statement does not
entail reliance on the nature and accuracy of the beliefs communicated. This statement does not
mean, however, that the court should not ask itself whether the third person was sufficiently
connected to the opponent of the evidence to make the false statement probative, or whether the
statement carries the risks associated with non-communicative conduct. See notes 205-18 and
accompanying text.
194. 187 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1951), discussed in notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
195. See note 166 and accompanying text.
196. Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 77-79 (cited in note 17), argues that this interpretation
involves an excessively subjective standard, yet he praises the objectivity of an essentially
identical standard, that of Stephen A. Saltzburg and Kenneth R. Redden, Federal Rules of
Evidence Manual 511 (Michie, 2d ed. 1977). Wellborn criticizes Saltzburg and Redden's standard
because it would not treat as hearsay the implicatures (see note 140) that the speaker possibly
might have intended. Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 80-81. Without stretching the discussion, it
seems that without supporting proof, the basis for that kind of implicature is uncertain, providing
insufficient reason to treat it as communicated. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory Committee's Note.
Compare Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 200-01 (cited in note
37) (discussing computability requirements for implicatures). Extreme uncertainty about
whether the speaker generally would have intended the hearer to make or strengthen an
assumption would make the communication irrelevant. See note 191.
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the speaker's goal and implicit claim that the communication complied
with the maxims of co-operation.
Those who disagree with this position, as McCormick does,
would contend that the meanings of the terms "assert," "assertive,"
and "assertion" are perfectly obvious. 197 McCormick admits, however,
that some people, such as Professor Morgan, do not agree with Mc-
Cormick's understanding of the term.198 Judges in at least five circuit
courts of appeal currently belong to the group that disagrees with
McCormick's interpretation. 99  Philosophers °  and cognitive
scientists2°' agree that the prototypical statement or assertion 2°2
evidences its intent with little indirection. These scholars also note,
however, that the speaker may endeavor to convey more than one idea
with a prototypical assertion2°3 and that the usual meaning of a
particular set of words may not, in itself, reflect the proposition that a
particular speaker intends to convey under particular circum-
stances.20 4 The classic use of hearsay is the proponent's use of an out-
of-court utterance to prove a fact at issue by arguing that the commu-
nication reflects its speaker's beliefs about events that tend to show
that fact, and that the belief is evidence of that fact. In this instance,
inferences about the speaker's intended meaning are indispensable.
The utterance, "Could it be a little more quiet in here?' may relate the
speaker's opinion that the stereo is too loud, rather than a question
about applied acoustics.
197. 2 McCormick 4th, § 246 at 98 n.5 (cited in note 8).
198. See note 191.
199. See United States v. Garcia, 718 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Reynolds, 715
F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v. Maher, 801 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Parker, 991 F.2d 1493 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Allen, 960 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In
addition, although the facts are not entirely clear, United States v. Rodriguez, 993 F.2d 1170, 1174
(5th Cir. 1993), seems to ignore the literalist heuristic, consistent with Park v. Huff, 403 F.2d 923
(5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Brown, 548 F.2d 1194 (5th Cir. 1977), but contrary to United
States v. Mazyak, 650 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1981).
200. See, for example, Searle, Expression and Meaning at 12 (cited in note 76).
201. See, for example, Sperber and Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition at 246
(cited in note 37).
202. See, for example, Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 121 (cited in note 51).
203. See, for example, id.; Searle, Expression and Meaning at 30 (cited in note 76).
204. See, for example, Grice, Studies in the Way of Words at 117-18 (cited in note 51); Searle,
Expression and Meaning at vii-ix (cited in note 76).
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E. Narrowing the Dangers Approach: Non-Communicative Conduct
Proponents °5 of Professor Morgan's dangers theory °8 could
argue that one should extend the definition of hearsay beyond the co-
operative analysis to include inferences based on conduct that out-
wardly does not intend to communicate any information. That exten-
sion would apply the hearsay rule to problems to which the rule and
its exceptions are ill-adapted.207 While cognitive science's teachings
are similar to the classic hearsay dangers approach, co-operative
analysis breaks with the treatment of non-communicative conduct
that the dangers approach implies.208 Suppose that the following
evidence is offered to show that it rained on a day in late April: Trey
looked out his office window, removed a trenchcoat from his closet,
donned it, and left his office at 3:30 p.m. To evaluate that evidence, 209
the decisionmaker must decide whether Trey believed that rain was
occurring or impending, and whether Trey's belief was accurate.
The dangers test indicates that Trey's action should be hear-
say. Because there is no reason to infer that Trey was trying to com-
municate anything, his sincerity may not be a substantial issue. 210 On
the other hand, ambiguity, or the problem of determining the actor's
motivation for the action, is particularly pressing with non-
communicative conduct. 211 Trey may have put on the coat simply
205. The degree of adherence ranges from Professor Graham's approach, which considers a
statement hearsay if, to make it relevant, one must rely on the content of the declarant's belief or
on that belief as establishing the truth of that belief, regardless of the magnitude of the risk,
Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.1 at 688 (cited in note 88), to Professors Lempert
and Saltzburg's approach, which considers the statement "I don't love you anymore" by a wife to
her husband not hearsay to show her lack of affection because the degree of risk that the
statement would be inaccurate is slight. Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence
at 363-64 (cited in note 38). Other adherents include Professor Tribe, 87 Harv. L. Rev. at 959
(cited in note 148), and possibly Friedman, 96 Yale L. J. at 687 (cited in note 22).
206. See notes 145-52 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of the exceptions, see notes 219-41 and accompanying text.
208. See, for example, Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 682-91 (cited in note 28); Tribe, 87 Harv.
L. Rev. at 972-73 (cited in note 148). Compare Friedman, 96 Yale L. J. at 723-29 (cited in note 22)
(arguing that the admissibility of the letters in Wright should not turn on whether the conduct
was assertive).
209. Assuming relevance, it is more likely that Trey would wear the trenchcoat if it were
raining than if it were not.
210. See, for example, Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.3 at 692 (cited in note
88); Lepert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence at 368 (cited in note 38). Of course,
there may occasionally be some risk that Trey intended to communicate and simply concealed it.
Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 697 (cited in note 28). The comment to Federal Rule 801(a) allows the
objecting party to raise Trey's intent to assert as a preliminary issue. F.R.E. 801(a), Advisory
Committee's Note.
211. Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence at 368 (cited in note 38);
Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 688-89 (cited in note 28); Tribe, 87 Harv. L. Rev. at 972 (cited in note
148).
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because he preferred not to carry it. He may also have decided a
trenchcoat was desirable because the area near the window was cold,
or perhaps he inaccurately believed rain was impending, or maybe he
saw others wearing their coats. Thus, Trey's actions generate
substantial uncertainty about the content of his beliefs about the
weather.
The problems with Trey's perception and memory are
somewhat similar. Even if Trey believed that rain was occurring or
impending, assessing the accuracy of Trey's belief entails judgments
about his perception, if not his memory. Trey's actions pose these
problems to the same extent as would Trey's explicit statement that it
was raining, which would be hearsay.212 Regarding Trey's perception,
poor background contrast could make it difficult to determine whether
or not it was raining out, particularly if his window were poorly
located.
Some non-assertive actions in reliance on a belief might be
specific enough to avoid any misunderstanding of the actor's belief,213
or sufficiently spontaneous214 or detrimental21' to the actor to make it
likely that the actor's belief was accurate. Nevertheless, there is no
real reason to conclude non-communicative actions pose a lesser
degree of classic hearsay risks than would inferences from the words
of a verbal statement. Under a dangers approach, therefore, any act
used to show a belief as a basis for inferring the proposition believed
can be hearsay.216
212. F.R.E. 803(1) would except the statement as a present sense impression.
213. Opening an umbrella on the street exemplifies this type of action. Graham, Handbook
of Federal Evidence § 801.3 at 692 (cited in note 88).
214. Id.
215. See, for example, Morgan, 48 Harv. L. Rev. at 1158-59 (cited in note 47). But see
Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 692 (cited in note 28) (explaining that non-communicative conduct
does not always assume such importance).
216. Advocates of the dangers test occasionally strain on this point. Professor Graham, a
fairly staunch advocate of the dangers test, see note 205, believes that non-assertive conduct is
not hearsay under that test because the sincerity risk is completely absent. Graham, Handbook
of Federal Evidence § 801.3 at 692 & n.3 (cited in note 88). There is always the chance that the
actor's intent to communicate could have been missed, however, in which case a sincerity risk ex-
ists. See note 210. Cross-examination, which Graham considers the most important reason for
the hearsay rule, is relatively ineffective at revealing insincerity. Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 188
(cited in note 5). Finally, if the complete absence of dangers such as perception and memory
would make a statement nonhearsay, there would be no reason, under the dangers test, for the
present sense impression and state of mind exceptions; everything they admit would be nonhear-
say.
Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 930 n.118 (cited in note 55), argues that "most" non-communicative
conduct should be hearsay if offered to show the actor's belief because a party might choose to
offer the conduct instead of live testimony as a strategic matter. This argument seems to be over-
inclusive for several reasons. Conduct that indicates the actor had a certain state of mind but is
not communicative does not convey the implicit claim of co-operation, and therefore does not pose
the same inferential task for the factfinder that communicative conduct poses. If, on the other
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The argument equating verbal and nonverbal conduct fails,
however, because the process of inference from communication differs
from the process of inferring the actor's state of mind from physical
behavior. Although one may recognize the sounds a speaker may
utter, those sounds will not convey a proposition unless the hearer can
make inferences about the speaker's goals and implicit assurance of
the statement's utility and can evaluate the communication in that
light. This statement is not true of inferences drawn from objectively
observable physical action-for example, conclusions one might draw
from sitting at the window of a second-floor study watching a child,
who is unaware of the observation, swing a baseball bat. The person
observing the swing has at least one fairly firm piece of evidence of the
actor's state of mind, the clear physical behavior, while the hearer's
perception and interpretation of verbal behavior vary with the
hearer's inferences about the speaker's state of mind.217
More importantly, when the proffering party submits an ap-
parent out-of-court communication for the factfinder's consideration, it
not only submits the words, or the physical conduct, but also the
speaker's (or actor's) implicit assurance that the communication was
relevant to the hearer's purposes-that a basis for the utterance or
action sufficient to commend it to the hearer's attention existed.
Inference from mere physical conduct involves no such convention.218
Conduct, therefore, should not be treated as the equivalent of hearsay
when there is insufficient reason to believe that the actor intended to
convey any proposition to any observer through the conduct. That is
hand, the conduct was such that the actor should have expected it to convey beliefs to the
observers, then it is hearsay if evaluating the implicit claim of co-operation would be essential to a
thoughtful determination of the issue for which the conduct is offered. Finally, the argument
sweeps into hearsay evidence such as third parties' habits, F.R.E. 406, on the theory that in-court
observation and cross-examination might benefit the factfinder, a proposition that confuses tools
for obtaining data for the factfinder with the factfinding process itself. Although the factfinder
might benefit from observation or cross-examination, these preconditions need not be mandated
for such evidence. See notes 219-28 and accompanying text. On the other hand, Professor Seigel
is primarily concerned with making non-communicative conduct hearsay to subject it to a rule of
preference. Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 930. Some uses of non-communicative conduct may require
such a rule, but not because they pose the same inferential problems as hearsay.
217. For discussion of the difficulty of accurately reporting words, as opposed to conduct, see,
for example, Allen and Kuhms, An Analytical Approach to Evidence at 489-90 (cited in note 15);
Report of the Committee on the Model Code of Evidence, 19 Cal. St. B. J. 262, 274 (1944); Park, 70
Minn. L. Rev. at 1059 (cited in note 117); Park, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 56-58 (cited in note 51).
218. If the communicative nature of an act is in question, that problem can be resolved
according to the Advisory Note. See note 176.
Scholars commonly argue that the hearsay rule should be read to promote cross-examination
whenever it would be useful, and because cross-examination of non-communicative conduct could
be helpful to the jury, that conduct should be classified as hearsay if offered to show the actor's
belief. See, for example, Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 685 (cited in note 28). That argument
somewhat over-estimates the utility of cross-examination. See notes 219-28 and accompanying
text.
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not to say that non-communicative acts should be freely admissible,
but only that other measures, such as Federal Rule 403, can best as-
sess their probative utility. Moreover, the current exceptions to the
hearsay rule primarily address verbal expressions, making them an
unwieldy device for assessing actions. For example, without evidence
that the actor intended to communicate by limping, it would not make
sense to assess out-of-court limping offered to show an injury under
the exceptions for present sense impressions or for statements of then-
existing physical condition. If available evidence indicated that the
actor was trying to convey information with the limp, then the excep-
tions would require the proffering party to offer the evidence needed to
evaluate the behavior at trial.
F. Cross-Examination and the Conventional Rationale for Exceptions
A frequent argument supporting the distinction between
hearsay and nonhearsay drawn by the dangers approach posits that
the hearsay rule intends to limit the admissibility of out-of-court
actions when a factfinder's judgment might benefit from observing a
cross-examination of the actor.2 19 Even if one declines to accept
Wigmore's dictum that cross-examination is "the greatest legal engine
... for the discovery of truth,"220 cross-examination obviously produces
a good deal of information that is helpful to the factfinder. The point,
however, is that cross-examination helps the factfinder-not that it is
good in itself. The availability of cross-examination also cannot
guarantee that the jury will hear supporting data necessary to
appraise testimony; the opponent may choose to forgo cross-
examination to de-emphasize the testimony,21 or may simply do a
poor job of cross-examination. 222 In addition, Professor Morgan points
out that cross-examination is often an ineffective test of the witness's
sincerity.22 Worse, cross-examination may cloud the issues if, for
example, the cross-examiner focuses the jury's attention on
irrelevancies in order to confuse their perception of the critical
219. See, for example, Allen and Kuhns, An Analytical Approach to Evidence at 319-20 (cited
in note 15); Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 684-85 (cited in note 28).
220. James H. Chadbourn, ed., 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1367 at 32 (Little, Brown, 1974).
221. See Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1788 n.9 (cited in note 98).
222. Of course, the party's incentive to cross-examine may not perfectly coincide with the
factfinder's wish for further information. See notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
223. Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 188 (cited in note 5); Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1793 (cited in
note 98).
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issues.2 24 Moreover, it is difficult to view the absence of cross-examina-
tion as the core reason for caution regarding hearsay evidence when a
large number of exceptions to the hearsay rule allow the admission of
hearsay uttered by a person who would be available to testify, but
need not be called to the stand.2 5 Finally, parties may prefer to test
other sorts of evidence by cross-examination, evidence few consider
hearsay. For example, a third party may make a repair on a negli-
gently manufactured product that remedies the alleged defect. 21 The
repair would be admissible if offered by plaintiff to show that the
product was defective. 22 The most thorough appraisal of the evidence,
however, would require cross-examination of the third party to ascer-
tain that party's perception of the product before the repair and her
motivation for making the repair. Even dangers test advocates are
unlikely to consider the repair hearsay.
The frequency with which some hearsay commentators empha-
size the importance of cross-examination as the justification for the
hearsay rule, in lieu of the inferential process that cross-examination
serves, is reminiscent of another confusion between tools and thought
pointed out by the German psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer. -28  Some
psychologists have relied on the usefulness of statistics as a check on
human reasoning to argue that reasoning under conditions of uncer-
tainty inherently conforms to a particular statistical theory, thus
erroneously transforming a tool for analyzing thought into a theory
about the essential nature of thought. Cross-examination may pro-
vide the best tool for testing testimonial evidence, but it is not the
equivalent of the inferential process it serves.
224. Compare Paul Roberts and Chris Wilmore, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice:
The Role of Forensic Science Evidence in Criminal Proceedings 127 (HMSO, 1992) (discussing the
use of this technique to discredit expert witnesses).
225. See F.R.E. 803(l)-(4), 803(6)-(23); Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 282 (cited in note 73).
Moreover, if correcting for the absence of cross-examination were the purpose of the hearsay
rules, statements of all unavailable declarants, who cannot be cross-examined, would be
admissible.
226. See F.R.E. 407.
227. Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1524 (1st Cir. 1991); Pau v. Yosemite Park
and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880, 887-88 (9th Cir. 1991). Daubert v. Merrill-Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797-98 (1993), relies heavily on cross-examination, yet considers peer
review of novel scientific theories or methods an important determinant of the probative value of
such theories or methods. Strongly emphasizing the importance of cross-examination (more
strongly than apparent in Daubert) would require the persons conducting the peer review to
testify in order for the novel theory to be admissible.
228. Gerd Gigerenzer, From Tools to Theories: A Heuristic of Discovery in Cognitive Psy-
chology, 98 Psychol. Rev. 254, 259-64 (1991). See also Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 382 (cited in
note 5) (stating, "The point of the conventional argument is not that statements are unreliable
unless cross-examined, which truly would be preposterous, but that factfinders-judges and juries
alike, but especially juries-lack what they need to evaluate most untested statements.").
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The conventional rationale for exceptions to the hearsay rule
maintains that the data those exceptions admit without cross-exami-
nation are both necessary and reliable (or trustworthy).229 Each is a
curious criterion. The use of the term "necessary" seems to imply that
because the other data supporting a proposition at issue are thin,
admission of the evidence is imperative. If the data supporting a
proposition are thin, however, and that thinness would be the critical
reason for admitting the evidence in question, then the court should
simply exclude the evidence. The court could then allow the proffering
party's opponent to move for a directed verdict.20 Otherwise, the
court would allow the proponent to prolong a futile argument.
Premising exceptions on rulemakers' categorical judgments of
reliability or trustworthiness is flawed in several ways.23 1 First, de-
spite claims to the contrary, rulemakers and courts that reflected on
the question would likely concede that not all the evidence that meets
the exceptions is necessarily sound. Otherwise, one excited utterance
would withstand a motion for a new trial or a directed verdict. Judg-
ments about the probative worth of evidence are highly qualified and
ex ante. Second, courts or rulemakers who decide whether categories
of evidence are categorically reliable thereby usurp the rightful func-
tion of factfinders who will hear the evidence in individual cases. The
only support for that usurpation assumes that individual factfinders
cannot evaluate evidence adequately, an implausible contention that
also conflicts with the theoretical basis for using factfinders in litiga-
tion.
229. See, for example, John Henry Wignore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1420 at
204 (Little, Brown, 3d ed. 1940). If the term "necessity" refers to evidence that the party would
consider necessary because of a lack of further evidence, then the necessity criterion essentially
allows the proponent of the evidence to make a claim that otherwise inadmissible evidence should
be admissible because the "proponent needs it to win." Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1371 (cited in note
5). Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1800-03 (cited in note 98), points out that the necessity principle
makes evidence admissible when its proponent needs it most, creating the greatest risk that the
factfinder may overvalue it, and inadmissible when the proponent needs it least and there is thus
minimal risk of overvaluation. Id. Moreover, a necessity standard seems to make admissibility
turn on manipulations of the order of proof. Id.
230. The opposing party also might request a peremptory instruction.
231. This Article assumes, in accordance with such arguments, that reliability and
trustworthiness imply a higher standard than the ex ante determination of utility the co-opera-
tive theory requires. See notes 98-106 and accompanying text. Professor Swift has pointed out
that courts have used notions of trustworthiness or reliability to erode the categorical limits in
various exceptions, particularly the residual exceptions. Eleanor Swift, The Hearsay Rule at
Work Has It Been Abolished De Facto by Judicial DecisionF, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 473, 492, 495, 503-
04(1992).
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G. The Exceptions
1. A System of Rules that Requires Data to Facilitate the Evaluation
of Communications
Critics of existing hearsay doctrine often assume that the only
reason to classify a statement as hearsay is to render that statement
inadmissible. As Morgan pointed out, that is not the case.23 2 Instead,
classifying a communication as hearsay creates an incentive for its
proponent to produce information about the declarant, or the circum-
stances in which she communicated, to enable the factfinder to
appraise the statement's probative value more efficiently. The
exceptions require the proponent to produce data that, together with
the statement, improve the utility of the evidence on the point for
which the proponent offered it.2 Classifying a statement as
nonhearsay, then, reduces the proponent's incentive and ultimately
the availability of that information. Similarly, a court may classify a
physical object as a document under the best evidence rule2 4 for
reasons other than categorical exclusion. Two of these reasons relate
to evaluation of the object: (i) having an original, or a good, copy of
-the object facilitates the evaluation of its probative value, and (ii)
knowing that an object is an original or reasonably accurate copy
ensures that the effort to evaluate the object is worthwhile. 235
In a slightly different light, the exceptions to the hearsay rule
require some minimal standard of possible impact, or likelihood of
effect on the factfinder's decision, to warrant the jury's effort to evalu-
ate the data. This standard reflects compliance with the co-operative
strategy implicit in communication.26  If a statement is offered under
Federal Rule 801 for the "truth" of the matter "asserted," in
evaluating the evidence's probative value, the jury must infer the
propositions that the statement communicated 7 and the extent to
which the statement indicates the truth of one or more of those
propositions. The exceptions' requirements for supporting data help to
232. Morgan, 48 Harv. L. Rev. at 1147 (cited in note 47).
233. Because many statements represent familiar situations, the jury may simplify its task
by using familiar knowledge in memory. See notes 54-72 and accompanying text. The large
number of exceptions allowing admissibility of written statements may reflect relatively low need
for further proof of context to allow interpretation of those statements, given the normally
increased precision in writing. See Park, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 72 n.85 (cited in note 51).
234. See FR.E. 1001 etseq.
235. See Nance, 73 Iowa L. Rev. at 257 (cited in note 73).
236. See notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
237. See notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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conform the jury's inferential task to the demands those factfinders
face in ordinary life-the source of the jury's expertise.238
This Article does not claim that the exceptions in the Federal
Rules reflect optimum formulations for insuring that hearsay evidence
warrants the processing effort necessary to evaluate it. The excep-
tions to the hearsay rule, however, provide data that help the fact-
finder to infer whether the speaker complied with the maxims of
communication and the extent to which any compliance makes the
statement useful evidence. 23 9
The co-operative theory offered here accounts for class excep-
tions and is consistent with the existing class exceptions. The hearsay
rule and its exceptions may seem an excessively complex scheme for
governing inference. Considering the way people ordinarily convey
knowledge about decisionmaking, however, the use of rules is fairly
common. One study argues that using rules is an unavoidable step in
teaching decisionmaking. 24° Four cognitive scientists have demon-
strated that a system involving a general rule, operating in default of
exceptions that are in turn subject to a number of other exceptions, is
more efficient for modeling a decision-making procedure than a single
rule system or a system of several co-ordinate rules.241
2. The Complexity of the System of Exceptions
Proponents of hearsay reform, or abolition of the hearsay rules,
often argue that the system of exceptions and exclusions is too compli-
cated and that the hearsay system makes too many unjustified cate-
gorical judgments about the utility of evidence. 242 They advocate flex-
238. In light of the residual exceptions to the hearsay rule, arguing that a particular piece of
hearsay should be admitted because it is not dangerous assumes the hearsay should be exempt
from the residual exceptions' notice requirements. See note 255 and accompanying text.
239. A discussion of specific exceptions would make this already lengthy Article unwieldy.
For now, it is enough to note that Professor Swifts belief that the foundation for the excited
utterance exception, F.R.E. 803(2), is too thin to ensure utility seems correct. Swift, 75 Cal. L.
Rev. at 1405 (cited in note 5). On the other hand, the utility of evidence admissible under the
business records exception, F.R.E. 803(6), is relatively uncontroversial. See, for example, Seigel,
72 B.U. L. Rev. at 934 (cited in note 55); Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 1359-60.
240. Hubert Dreyfus and Stuart Dreyfus, Mind Over Machine: The Power of Human
Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer 20-22 (New York Free Press, 1986).
241. John N. Holland, et al., Induction: Processes of Inference, Learning, and Discovery, 29-67
(M.I.T., 1986).
242. See, for example, Edmund M. Morgan and John M. Maguire, Looking Forward and
Backward at Evidence, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 921 (1937); Weinstein, 46 Iowa L. Rev. at 344-46
(cited in note 5); Brysh, Comment, 35 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 615-16 (cited in note 5). Certainly,
perceptions of the data that support a communication's utility have changed over time. See, for
example, Imwinkelried, 41 Fla. L. Rev. at 231-39 (cited in note 40); Park, 70 Minn. L. Rev. at 1069
(cited in note 117).
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ible standards, which would make the admissibility of hearsay de-
pendent on criteria such as Federal Rule 403 or on the satisfaction of
more general criteria such as the unavailability of the speaker or
evidence about her honesty.
Although some current exceptions may require revision, using
rules to separate admissible hearsay from inadmissible hearsay is
beneficial for several reasons.24 Assume for the sake of argument
that a class of hearsay exists that would always satisfy the criteria for
optimal exceptions, or would satisfy them so often that a simple pro-
viso to a rule admitting that category of data would be appropriate.
Excepting that class of data from the hearsay prohibition would save a
court time and conserve its resources by minimizing arguments over
the admissibility of such data at trial. Such an exception also would
conserve resources at the appellate level by specifying the criteria that
the trial judge and the appellate court must use.244 To the extent that
evidence rules can affect out-of-court conduct (such as a business
record rule), these rules encourage persons to preserve evidence that
is admissible under the rule and to adopt protocols, such as
recordkeeping, that provide better evidence of their activities. 245 More
flexible standards would require parties to expend more resources to
assure admissibility or forgo the benefits of advance planning.246
The benefits of categorical rules excluding evidence,24 such as
Federal Rule 803(3)'s exclusion of "statements of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed,"2 48 are similar. Such rules
allow courts to dispose of frequently occurring problems with minimal
243. See Tillers and Schum, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 857-58 & n.55 (cited in note 22).
244. Kaplow, 42 Duke L. J. at 563 (cited in note 54). Professor Swift points out one of the
problems in relying on general rules, such as relevancy or F.R.E. 403, to govern the admissibility
of hearsay: these rules are not sufficiently fine-grained to deal with the problems hearsay poses
without reinstating a new system of common-law exceptions, in the case of relevancy, or
employing an inapposite test, in the case of Rule 403. Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 499-503, 516 (cited
in note 114). Finman, 14 Stan. L. Rev. at 702 (cited in note 28), referring to Rule 403's intellectual
predecessor, agrees.
Moreover, any attempt to use a discretionary standard in lieu of the exceptions to simplify the
admissibility rules is likely to fail. Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 397 (cited in note 5), and Seigel,
72 B.U. L. Rev. at 914 (cited in note 55), point out that unless discretion under the standard is
complete, it merely will substitute case-based complexity for rule-based complexity.
245. Kaplow, 42 Duke L. J. at 564 (cited in note 54). See Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 914 (cited
in note 55).
246. Kaplow, 42 Duke L. J. at 621. While hearsay rules may differ from the rules usually
referenced in discussions of planning, for example, commercial and tort law, discussions of
hearsay reform repeatedly stress the goal of avoiding unfair surprise. See, for example, Mueller,
76 Minn. L. Rev. at 396-97 (cited in note 5); Park, 86 Mich. L. Rev. at 62-63 (cited in note 51);
Weinstein, 44 F.R.D. at 380 (cited in note 98).
247. Professor Seigel misunderstands the point in the text. Seigel, 72 B.U. L. Rev. at 915
n.69 (cited in note 55). The theory depends very little on categorical rules of inadmissibility,
although some may be warranted.
248. F.R.E. 803(3).
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resource expenditures. To the extent that exclusion of the evidence
clearly affects the parties' relative likelihood of success, such rules
encourage settlement and dispose of weak or questionable claims.249
Complaints about the number and complexity of hearsay ex-
ceptions generally are overstated. Because many cases involve only a
few hearsay exceptions, and because particular exceptions such as the
provision for records of religious organizations are used infrequently,
the de jure number of exceptions can create a mistaken impression.
The de facto250 complexity of the hearsay system is considerably less
than one might think, particularly if one is currently studying for an
evidence examination, or trying to draw distinctions between two
related, seldom-used exceptions.2 51
The residual exceptions2 52 counter-balance the rigidity of the
categorical exceptions. If data that do not fit a categorical exception
nevertheless reveal that a communication has sufficient marginal
utility for factfinding, the court may admit the data under a residual
exception. Accordingly, arguments that particular sorts of communi-
cation should not be hearsay because they are reliable or trustworthy
essentially parallel arguments that the proponent should not be sub-
ject to the requirements of the residual exceptions. In other words,
these arguments not only would allow the proponent to dispense with
249. See note 117 and accompanying text.
250. See Kaplow, 42 Duke L. J. at 557 (cited in note 54).
251. For example, a search on the Westlaw system in the ALLFEDS data base on July 22,
1993, using the query EVI.R! FED.R.E.! F.R.E. F.R.EV! EVID! FED.EV! RULE FED.RULE! /3
(803 + 2 11 12 13 15 19 23) 803(11) 803 (12) 803 (13) 803 (15) 803 (19) 803 (23), yielded a total of
seven citations for four hearsay exceptions. Roberto v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 774
F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1985) (F.R.E. 803(11)); Hall v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 729 F.2d 632
(9th Cir. 1984) (same); Benjamin v. Kelly, No. 91 Civ. 0164 (VLB), 1993 WL 120379 (S.D.N.Y. Apr.
14, 1993) (F.R.E. 803(12)); McMorrow v. Schweiker, 561 F. Supp. 584 (D. N.J. 1982) (F.R.E. 803
(12) and (13)); Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Wyo. 1985) (F.R.E. 803(15));
DeRochemont v. Commissioner, 62 T.C.M. (CCH) 1384 (T.C. 1991) (same).
252. F.R.E. 803(24), 804(b)(5). References to these exceptions do not imply that they are
flawless, particularly in application. Their references to 'equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" invite judges to substitute their judgments of the worth of evidence for criteria
that facilitate the factfinders' evaluation of the evidence. "[]f a federal judge believed that the
Portuguese gentleman's statement was made under conditions suggesting its trustworthiness, Sir
Walter [Raleigh] might fare no better today than he did under Elizabeth." Bergman, 75 Ky. L. J.
at 883 (cited in note 9). For discussions of the difficulties with the residual exceptions, particu-
larly as applied, see, for example, linwinkelried, 41 Fla. L. Rev. at 246-50 (cited in note 40); Myrna
Raeder, The Hearsay Rule at Work Has It Been Abolished by Judicial Discretion?, 76 Minn. L.
Rev. 507 (1992).
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the notice requirement of the residual exceptions,25 but also to dis-
pense with the requirement that the evidence be "more probative on
the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts."254 Avoiding the
notice requirement would be incompatible with many suggestions for
hearsay reform.255 In addition, eliminating the requirement that the
court weigh probative value undermines the argument that the
evidence should be considered nonhearsay because of its probative
value.
Finally, persons who argue for more flexible, or less fact-based,
standards of admission ignore humans' tendency to develop fixed
criteria based on their prior decisions and experience. In other words,
courts will inevitably develop fact-based exceptions, as illustrated in
the highly questionable line of cases holding that questions do not fall
within the hearsay rule because they are not statements.2 1- Such
exceptions may unwisely allow the admission of an utterance such as,
"Don't you think X is the murderer?" to show that X was the murderer
on the theory that the communication was not a statement. While no
formulae will avoid all anomalies, well-formulated rules can help the
judge make efficient and effective admissibility decisions.257
A co-operative analysis of the flaws in the dangers theory indi-
cates why hearsay doctrine must distinguish between communicative
and non-communicative conduct and explains the role of the excep-
tions in winnowing useful hearsay from the chaff. The Article turns
now to the main source of the complexity in American hearsay doc-
trine, the literalist heuristic and related strategies for truncating the
definition of hearsay, to remove implied assertions from the reach of
the hearsay rules.
253. Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 838 (cited in note 5), argues that classifying implied assertions
as hearsay would subject too much useful evidence to the notice requirements.
254. F.R.E. 803(24)(B), 804(b)(5)(B).
255. See, for example, Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 410 (cited in note 5); Park, 86 Mich. L.
Rev. at 117-18 (cited in note 51). See note 246.
256. See note 34 and accompanying text. Additionally, local practice frequently excludes
from hearsay statements made in the presence of the party against whom they are offered. 2
McCormick 4th, § 246 at 98-99 (cited in note 8).
257. Consider F.R.E. 803(7) and 803(10), inserted to point out that the absence of entries in
records, which is not hearsay under the rules, is admissible. The Committee inserted those rules
to remedy frequent errors. F.R.E. 803(7) and 803(10), Advisory Committee's Notes.
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V. THE CO-OPERATIVE THEORY IN PRACTICE
A. Less Than Words Can Say: Implication in Communicative Conduct
1. The Prototypical Case
Every analysis of implied assertions touches on Wright v. Doe
d. Tatham.25 In Wright, the court examined whether certain letters25
sent to the testator should be admissible to show his competence.
Although the letters each expressed some regard or respect for the
testator, and two asked him to undertake some action,6 0 none explic-
itly addressed the testator's mental capacity. The court excluded the
letters, offered to show the testator's mental capacity, as hearsay.261
The case apparently has been debated ever since.
Under the co-operative theory, the letters are hearsay if offered
to show the testator's competence because they are offered to show the
writers' beliefs about the testator's cognitive capacities, a set of infe-
rences that the writers would have generally intended262 the testator
to make. Consider, for instance, the statement of one of the writers,
the testator's cousin, who said, 'You should have been the first person
in the world I would have wrote to... ."m The cousin could have
meant to express, in varying degrees, respect, affection, solicitude
given the testator's delicate condition,26 4 or any combination of the
three. The cousin also might have meant to reassure the testator by
falsely stating his opinion of the testator-telling an innocuous lie.
258. 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838). For cases that consider Wright good law under the Federal
Rules, see, for example, Lyle v. Koehler, 720 F.2d 426, 429-35 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v.
Ariza-Ibarra, 605 F.2d 1216, 1222 (lst Cir. 1979). But see United States v. Singer, 687 F.2d 1135,
1147 (8th Cir. 1982), reh'g, 710 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1983), on remand, 575 F. Supp. 63 (D. Minn.
1983); United States v. Snow, 517 F.2d 441, 443-45 (9th Cir: 1975).
259. The lower court's opinion sets out all the letters. Wright v. Doe d. Tatham, 112 Eng.
Rep. 488, 490-92 (Ex. Ch. 1837), afrd, 7 Eng. Rep. 559 (H.L. 1838).
260. A letter from the vicar of Lancaster asked the testator to settle some litigation and to
reply to the letter. Wright, 7 Eng. Rep at 561. The testator's cousin asked him to relay greetings
to relatives. Id. at 560.
261. Id. at 565,575, 579, 583-84, 587,592,595-97.
262. Professor Park relies on his theory of communicative intention to smooth the roughest
edges of the literalist heuristic. His theory, however, seems to use specific intention regarding
Wright: *it would violate ordinary conventions of language to say that the letters in Wright v.
Tatham are offered to prove the truth of what they assert." Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 800-01
(cited in note 5).
263. Wright, 7 Eng. Rep. at 560.
264. The Exchequer Chamber's decision reveals a fair amount of evidence suggesting that
the testator was mentally unbalanced and perceived as such in the community. Wright, 112 Eng.
Rep. at 490.
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Without more data, the meaning that the cousin intended to convey is
highly questionable. So too is the cousin's goal in communicating.
Thus, without more evidence of the intentions of Marsden's correspon-
dents, the letters' value as evidence does not warrant the effort neces-
sary to evaluate them.265
Hearsay literalists and dangers approach advocates each tend
to treat the correspondents' dispatch of the letters as the equivalent of
nonverbal conduct.26 Apparently, they believe the letters are conduct
rather than assertions because the letters do not precisely declare the
testator's competence. This assumption ignores both empirical re-
search and common experience. It ignores empirical evidence that the
understanding of language is inherently inferential217 and an attempt
to impose "literal" construction on assertions is therefore doomed to
fail. Communication proceeds implicitly as well as explicitly. There is
no reason to suppose that the writers in Wright would not have
expected Marsden to make inferences about their opinions of him
based on the letters.268 Writing Marsden would be pointless unless
they could expect him to credit them with co-operation. Even if a
declarant were to write, "While I don't necessarily agree with her
conclusion, you might want to consider that Zelda is of opinion X," the
declarant is, at the least, representing that Zelda's judgment X may
be worthy of consideration.
Certainly there is no reason to treat a letter as anything other
than an assertion 2 9-it is, after all, meant to communicate. The ques-
tion then is how one determines the scope of the assertion. If the
hearsay rules serve a purpose that coheres with ordinary reasoning,
the Wright letters should be hearsay for the purpose for which they
were proffered. Further proof about the authors' intentions and co-
operation is necessary to evaluate the letters as proof of Marsden's
competency. In other words, further data are needed to (i) render the
likely probative value of the evidence sufficient to warrant the
265. In any event, the letters were irrelevant. See note 274 and accompanying text.
266. See Wellborn, 61 Tex. L. Rev. at 58 (cited in note 17). Even Morgan, a dangers advocate
who labelled the letters hearsay, may have considered the letters the equivalent of non-
communicative conduct. Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 207 (cited in note 5).
267. See notes 74-86, 134-54, and accompanying text.
268. See, for example, Vaughn C. Ball, The Changing Shape of the Hearsay Rule, 38 Ala.
Law. 502, 507 (1977). Arguments that the letters do not convey any information about the
recipient's mental abilities, yet are probative on the issue of competence, are anomalous; they are
tantamount to arguing that mail addressed to "Occupant' should be admissible to show the
recipient's competence.
269. McCormick concedes this point. 2 McCormick 4th § 250 at 111 (cited in note 8).
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cognitive effort necessary to evaluate the letters and (ii) avoid any
implication that the court endorsed evidence of questionable value.270
Dangers test advocates occasionally argue that the Wright
letters are nonhearsay, contending that the letters do not pose hear-
say dangers271 sufficient to make the letters hearsay. 72 This position
is another version of the argument that categorical reliability should
determine whether hearsay is admissible.2 73 Even if reliability were
the criterion, it would not save the Wright letters. In Wright, the
letters were written no less than twenty-three years before the execu-
tion of the will in question, and twenty-six years before the codicil.274
Under those circumstances, and in view of the hearsay nature of the
letters, their probative value did not warrant the factfinder's cognitive
effort to evaluate them and they were rightfully excluded.
B. Related Techniques for Truncating Hearsay Rules
Hearsay reformers often have tried to remove statements from
the definition of hearsay that even the literalist approach might oth-
erwise treat as hearsay,275 many of which would be admissible under
exceptions in any event.2 76 While the difference may seem trivial in
many cases, it can cause considerable mischief in others.277 This
subpart explores two attempts to truncate the reach of the hearsay
rule.
1. Inferring Events from Knowledge
In Bridges v. State,'28 the court held admissible as nonhearsay
a child's description to police of the room in which she allegedly had
been sexually molested, reasoning that the specificity of her descrip-
tion indicated she had knowledge of the defendant's room, which
270. See notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
271. These advocates may contend that the letters simply do not pose one specific danger:
sincerity. See, for example, Allen and Kuhns, An Analytical Approach to Evidence at 321 (cited in
note 15).
272. Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence at 366-69 (cited in note 38).
273. See notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
274. Morgan, 62 Harv. L. Rev. at 208 n.67 (cited in note 5).
275. See, for example, 2 McCormick 4th § 249 at 102, 113-15 (cited in note 8).
276. Most so-called verbal parts of an act would be admissible as present sense impressions
or declarations of present state of mind. McCormick also tries to exempt from hearsay treatment
the statement 'I believe I am Henry the Eighth" offered to show insanity, when it would be
admissible under the state of mind exception, for essentially the same reasons that exception
exists. Id. § 274 at 233.
277. See notes 299-300, 312-17, 321-23, and accompanying text.
278. 247 Wis. 350, 19 N.W.2d 529 (1945).
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provided circumstantial evidence that she had been in the room.279
McCormick claims that other means of knowledge were eliminated in
Bridges.211 That assumption is questionable,28 but even if McCormick
were correct, the appellate court in Bridges noted that the child's
original out-of-court statement, made before there was any opportu-
nity for police influence, was "not too much out of line, although it was
not distinctive enough to be of much value either way."282 This obser-
vation suggests that the child could have formulated the description
based on unintentional cues provided by the police or her parents. In
addition, if the question is whether a statement is offered "for the
truth of the matter it asserts," the matter asserted does not vary with
the sources of the declarant's knowledge. The child in Bridges implic-
itly assured the police and her parents that the room description she
was providing would be useful in finding the person who had abused
her.28 Jurors could not miss the child's implicit claim of co-operation
for those purposes.
Dangers advocates who consider cases such as Bridges non-
hearsay2m concede that inferences about the probative value of such
statements necessarily involve judgments about the declarant's be-
liefs. They contend, however, that at least where the proffering party
can negate a sufficient number of alternative sources of information,
the fact that the declarant had sufficient knowledge of a non-public
phenomenon to formulate a specific description is sufficient evidence of
her access to the phenomenon to make the statement admissible.285
As Judge Weinstein pointed out in United States v. Muscato,28 how-
ever, such judgments are extremely questionable. In one Swedish
case apparently identical to Bridges, the child gave a detailed descrip-
tion of the apartment, which authorities thought highly probative.
Further inquiry revealed that the child dishonestly formulated a
description based on prior exposure to another, basically identical,
room in the same dormitory.28 7
279. Bridges, 19 N.W.2d at 535.
280. 2 McCormick 4th § 250 at 115 (cited in note 8).
281. Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 438 n.47 (cited in note 8).
282. Bridges, 19 N.W.2d at 534.
283. See notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
284. See, for example, Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence at 362 (cited
in note 38). Contrast Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.6 at 708 (cited in note 88);
Edmund M. Morgan, Evidence, 1941-1945,59 Harv. L. Rev. 481,544 (1946).
285. See, for example, Lempert and Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence at 362 (cited
in note 38). See Friedman, 96 Yale L. J. at 682-83 & nn.38, 40 (cited in note 22) (describing
admissibility turning on uniqueness and specificity of description).
286. 534 F. Supp. 969, 977 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
287. Id.
104 [Vol. 47:43
HEARSAY AND INFORMAL REASONING
Attempting to distinguish hearsay from nonhearsay based on a
conclusion that a particular statement poses only minimal hearsay
dangers traps the court in the same logical circle as would any theory
based on ex ante judgments of reliability.m Although the jury is sup-
posed to assess hearsay risks posed by the evidence, the dangers
theory requires the court to perform that duty before the evidence is
submitted to the jury. The court often would face such an issue in the
absence of the data provided by the fulfillment of an exception, infor-
mation that would make the assessment of those risks easier for the
judge.
The point of treating the Bridges child's statement as hearsay
is not to render it inadmissible,29 but rather to direct questions about
the admissibility of the statement and similar communications
through a matrix of exceptions that articulate criteria, based on
factfinders' needs, for separating evidence that warrants admission
from that which does not.290
One might argue that the child's action or assertion is irrele-
vant, and thus that its classification under the hearsay rule is periph-
eral. That is not the case, however, if one accepts the argument for
nonhearsay treatment: that the statement is nonhearsay because the
Bridges child had too few alternative sources of information, and so
must have received the information from visiting the defendant's
room. Adherence to that argument essentially would refute a
relevance objection, and probably surmount an objection under Rule
403 as well. Even assuming that good reason to narrow the hearsay
rule exists, 2 91 Professor Park, among others, has pointed out that
makeshift concepts such as inferences from knowledge offered to show
the basis for that knowledge292 are vague enough to be troublesome
and are essentially unsupported by any justification or criticism of
hearsay doctrine.
Professor Baciga 293 cites a Virginia case, which relies on the
same theory as Bridges, that might create the potential for an
288. See Note, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1805 (cited in note 98).
289. The Bridges statement might be admissible under a residual exception, Graham,
Handbook of Federal Evidence § 801.6 at 708 (cited in note 88), or as a fresh account offered to
negate jurors' inferences of recent fabrication, particularly in a child abuse case. Park, 65 Minn.
L. Rev. at 441 (cited in note 8).
290. See generally notes 232-41 and accompanying text.
291. See note 17 and accompanying text.
292. For a discussion of such inferences, see United States v. Muscato, 534 F. Supp. 969, 974-
80 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). Professor Park's discussion is in Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 437-39 (cited in
note 8).
293. Ronald J. Bacigal, Implied Hearsay: Defusing the Battle Line Between Pragmatism and
Theory, 11 S.I.U. L. Rev. 1127, 1141 (1987).
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injustice. In Church v. Commonwealth,294 the court received a child's
statement discouraging her mother from having intercourse with the
mother's husband because sex was "dirty, nasty and it hurt." Noting
that the prosecution did not offer the statement to describe sex, the
court held the statement to be nonhearsay against the mother's
husband in a forcible sodomy prosecution to show that the child had
"an attitude likely to have been created by a traumatic experience."295
The child's statement to her mother also implicitly communicated that
the child had an adequate basis for her conclusion about sex, as part
of her implicit claim of co-operation. The record in Church included
evidence that indicated the child had been sexually abused, and that
the husband was sexually aroused in the child's presence.2 96 The court
did not, however, rely on the other evidence relating to the possibility
of sexual abuse in admitting the child's statement. With all due
respect to the Virginia court, it is extremely easy to imagine several
non-traumatic sources for the child's attitude. 297
As Professor Park notes, the rationale underlying the
classification of statements such as those in Bridges and Church as
nonhearsay, on the theory that they have circumstantial value
without regard to their speakers' veracity, would eviscerate the
hearsay rule.298 Any out-of-court statement that could accurately
depict a phenomenon has some possible value for drawing inferences
about that phenomenon; the question is whether the statement is
sufficiently valuable to warrant admission. While a defender of
Church might argue that no prosecutor would proceed without
evidence of sexual abuse other than the child's statement,299 or that a
trial court could direct a verdict3o° for the defendant if the only
evidence of sexual abuse were the child's statement, either argument
proves too much. If the system were to rely on parties' judgments
about the basis for their own claims, or on trial courts' action
preempting judgments on thin evidence, rules of evidence, including
hearsay rules, would be unnecessary. This Article now explores a
294. 230 Va. 208, 335 S.E.2d 823,825 (1985).
295. Id. at 825-26.
296. Id.
297. Bacigal, 11 S.I.U. L. Rev. at 1143 (cited in note 293), notes that the child might have
heard a friend make the statement, observed adults engaged in sexual intercourse, or heard the
attitude expressed in mass media, particularly drama. Professor Page has told the Author that
this attitude is common among children receiving their first information about human
reproduction.
298. Park, 65 Minn. L. Rev. at 438 (cited in note 8).
299. On parties' incentives to use hearsay, see notes 114-15, 124-26, and accompanying text.
300. The availability of directed verdicts on such evidence in a civil case is at least suspect.
See Swift, 75 Cal. L. Rev. at 503-06, 509-512, 516-18 (cited in note 114).
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dramatic attempt to truncate the hearsay rule, ostensibly in the
service of reform, that could have led to difficulties in application as
well as inaccurate factfinding.
2. Requests as Hearsay
In a recent case from the House of Lords, The Queen v. Kear-
ley,3o1 police found amphetamines in Kearley's flat, which he shared
with his wife and another man.30 2 The wife and the other man each
were convicted of offenses related to the possession of ampheta-
mines.3 03 The police did not find a sufficient quantity of the drug to
"give rise in itself to the inference that [Kearley intended to sell it]."04
Kearley was arrested and taken to the police station, but the police
officers remained in his flat, receiving a number of telephone calls in
which the caller asked for Kearley by a nickname and asked for drugs,
apparently unspecified.305 Several visitors to the flat asked for
Kearley and made additional unspecified requests for drugs.3 06
Kearley was either out of earshot or absent when the calls took
place.307 The trial court admitted evidence of the calls, and convicted
Kearley of possession with intent to supply.308 On appeal to the House
of Lords, the issue was stated as whether one call would be admissible
to show Kearley's intent to sell the drugs at issue.31° Kearley asserted
that the other residents had placed the drugs in his flat and,
apparently, had intended to sell the drugs.310 The Court of Appeals
had held that the calls were nonhearsay because they demonstrated
that a market for drugs existed at the flat.31, The House of Lords held
to the contrary, notwithstanding arguments that no call asserted that
Kearley was selling drugs and that the Court of Appeals' reasoning
was correct.
Taking the issue as posed to the House of Lords, the Crown
clearly would have expected the factfnder to infer from the call that
Kearley had sold drugs in the past, or had indicated that he was will-
301. 2 App. Cas. 228,2 W.L.R. 656,2 All E.R. 345 (H.L. 1992).
302. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 252,2 W.L.R. at 673,2 All E.R. at 361.
303. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 252,2 W.L.R. at 673,2 All E.R. at 361.
304. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 252,2 W.LR. at 673, 2 All E.R. at 361.
305. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 236,2 W.L.R. at 658,2 All E-R. at 347.
306. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 236, 2 W.L.R. at 658, 2 All E.R. at 347-48. Two visitors asked for
the 'usual amount." Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 243, 2 W.L.R. at 665,2 All E.R. at 354.
307. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 243,2 W.L.R. at 674,2 All E.R. at 362.
308. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 252,2 W.L.R. at 673-74,2 All E.R. at 361.
309. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 242, 2 W.L.R. at 664,2 All E.R. at 353.
310. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 252-53, 2 W.L.R. at 674,2 All E.R. at 361.
311. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 238, 2 W.L.R. at 660, 2 All E.R. at 349.
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ing to do so at the time of the arrest. According to Grice's maxims,
given the other evidence in the record, the factfnder could only as-
sume that the caller intended to convey her belief that Kearley might
be able and willing to sell her drugs, in reliance on the factfinders'
imagination about the world of illegal drug use. Otherwise, the fact-
finders would conclude that the caller had tried to reach Kearley in a
random quest for drugs. A random call would violate the conventions
of communication, and create an extreme risk of arrest for those who
called in person. Without further proof, however, there is no way to
test a single caller's evidence, which would be critical to whether
Kearley possessed the drug at issue with intent to sell.312  If one
distinguishes between hearsay and nonhearsay in light of the jurors'
need for information that enables them to assess the dangers of
making inferences from a particular extra-judicial communication, a
single call should be hearsay. Evaluating the communication would
require information relating to the caller's compliance with the
conventions of communication-essentially the reason the majority
classified it as hearsay.313
Arguing that the numerous calls were admissible to show a
drug market existed at the flat is reminiscent of a strategy sometimes
used to remove similar calls from the hearsay rule by labelling them
verbal.acts, or parts of acts. In cases in which police have conducted a
raid and answered calls during the raid seeking to place bets or order
drugs,3 14 courts often have admitted such calls as verbal parts of acts.
If proof of reputation or character of the premises were an element of
the crime, classifying the calls as verbal parts of acts "when under the
substantive law the pertinent inquiry is directed only to objective
manifestations rather than to the actual intent or other state of mind
of the actor"315 might make sense. If, on the other hand, one argues
312. The buyers might have heard that drugs were available at the house, known Kearley
beforehand, and connected the two on their own, demonstrating that Kearley was not necessarily
willing to sell the drugs. See Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at 767 (cited in note 36) (noting, in a
closely analogous hearsay problem, the possibility of alternative explanations for calls offering to
place bets, often considered nonhearsay in gambling prosecutions).
313. In reading the Kearley case, one should be aware that the hearsay exceptions in English
criminal courts are much more narrow than those in the United States. The dissents in Kearley,
therefore, may have been partially motivated by the vastly increased difficulty of admitting
hearsay in English courts.
314. See, for example, State v. Tolisano, 136 Conn. 210, 70 A.2d 118 (1949) (admitting
testimony that calls were received from parties seeking to place bets as evidence that bets were
being placed); United States v. Gaines, 726 F. Supp. 1457 (E.D. Pa.), aftd, 902 F.2d 1558 (3d. Cir.
1989) (admitting testimony of the police as to telephone calls received at the defendant's
apartment as evidence that the apartment and its occupants were a known source of drugs). See
2 McCormick 4th § 249 at 102 n.7 (cited in note 8).
315. See 2 McCormick 4th § 249 at 102 (cited in note 8). In Tolisano, the defendant was
charged with "maintaining a room with apparatus and devices for the purpose of making,
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that the call indicates that the callers' willingness to give information
about themselves "and speak with anyone who answered is evidence
that anyone present likely was"316 taking bets or selling drugs, then
the calls are not offered to show any objective manifestations in order
to satisfy a substantive standard. The callers' putative willingness to
buy drugs from Kearley revealed nothing other than, at most, his
reputation or prior actions. 317 Concededly, courts may be willing to
ignore the rules governing proof of character or reputation to the
extent a large number of calls, which do not seem inspired by the
same source, shows that the evidence warrants the factfinders' efforts
to evaluate it. That willingness has little to do with the way the
callers word their statements, however, or with arguments that proof
of the defendant's conduct or intention is somehow subject to an
objective standard.
The Kearley case was probably correct to classify the calls as
hearsay. Certainly, it was correct as the issue was posed to the House
of Lords-whether a single call would be hearsay. Without more evi-
dence bearing on the caller's implicit claim of co-operation, and be-
cause the other tenants could have been selling the amphetamine,
classifying a single call as hearsay would ultimately serve ordinary
reasoning. Moreoever, classifying the call as hearsay would prevent
convictions based on highly risky evidence, which police might other-
wise try to fabricate, since the defense could not have effectively
refuted police claims that a call had occurred in Kearley's absence.318
recording, or registering bets or wages." Tolisano, 70 A.2d at 118. From this charge emerges a
very weak potential argument about the character of the premises: that the premises were a
gambling den, and the defendant had reason to know it.
316. Gaines, 726 F.2d at 1468.
317. See Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 273, 2 W.L.R. at 693, 2 All E.R. at 378. Kearley admitted a
prior illegal transfer of other quantities of amphetamine. 2 App. Cas. at 252, 2 W.L.R. at 673, 2
All E.R. at 361. He did not argue that he accidentally possessed the amphetamine involved in the
count on appeal, but rather that he did not possess the amphetamine at issue, nor did he possess
it for sale. 2 App. Cas. at 252,2 W.L.R. at 674,2 All E.R. at 361.
318. People v. ScaL-i, 126 Cal. App. 3d 901, 179 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981), a closely
analogous California case, reached the same conclusion. The defendant, John Scalzi, arrested at
the home of friends during a narcotics raid, testified he was there to borrow grocery money. Id. at
61. He was convicted of conspiracy to sell, and possession for the sale of, methamphetamine. Id.
Evidence linking Scalzi to the drugs was "thin." Id. at 62. One policeman testified that during the
raid, he answered the telephone at the apartment. The anonymous caller asked if "John was
there," "if he had taken care of business," and "if John had gotten it bagged up." Id. at 62. The
court held the telephone conversation inadmissible hearsay because it was offered to show that
Scalzi was bagging drugs for sale. Id. at 63-64. No evidence established the source of the caller's
information, its reliability, or her motivation to be accurate, making evaluation of her implicit
claim impossible. On the other hand, the vast majority of American cases treat such statements
as nonhearsay. See, for example, Mueller, 76 Minn. L. Rev. at 413 n.133 (cited in note 5).
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C. Practical Consequences
Hearsay doctrine has proceeded on somewhat inaccurate as-
sumptions about communication, resulting in a good share of the
complexity that engenders criticism of the hearsay rules. Although
this Article does not propose any changes in the wording of the Fed-
eral Rules, a critic might raise objections, analogous to those Professor
Park raised, to the possibility that the rulemakers might adopt the
dangers analysis's definition of hearsay. First, whether using the
literalist heuristic has led to injustice is unclear.319 Second, the courts
have evolved a number of standards under the Federal Rules that
admit useful evidence, and might be unavailable under other
understandings of the definition of hearsay without amendment of the
rules.3 20
The question of whether the literalist analysis of hearsay leads
to injustice depends on the facts in litigated cases. A trial court may
admit fairly rank hearsay, yet the appellate court might not reverse if
the other evidence of guilt made the error harmless. Although one
could not say the trial court worked an injustice, it clearly erred. On
the other hand, in cases in which the communication is critical evi-
dence, courts may refuse to rely on the literalist understanding.
32
'
People v. Scalzia 2 provides an example. Had the court decided Scalzi
otherwise, and were the' facts as the opinion indicates, the police
officer's testimony about the intercepted phone call 82 would simply be
too consistent with a frame-up to warrant a conviction. If the facts
were similar to those put to the House of Lords in Kearley, and only
one call was offered to show possession with intent to sell, a conviction
based on that evidence would be dubious at best. The courts in those
two cases avoided errors not because they relied on the literalist view,
but because they abandoned it. The co-operative theory articulates
the intuition on which courts such as those in Scalzi and Kearley
relied to repudiate the literalist heuristic. It appears that adherence
to the literalist heuristic may lead to injustice.
319. Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 836 (cited in note 5).
320. Id. at 837-38.
321. Park believes this phenomenon explains Scalzi. Id. at 812-13 n.151. Park v. Huff, 493
F.2d 923, 925 (5th Cir. 1974), finding an implied assertion hearsay, noted that the evidence was
"crucial" and "devastating." The court likely would examine more closely the wisdom of admitting
critical evidence as nonhearsay, and would be more willing to set aside applications of a heuristic
principle in such circumstances. Park, 74 Minn. L. Rev. at 827-28 (cited in note 5), notes that
courts tend to apply the literalist heuristic "in situations in which the [hearsay] dangers are
minimal." On the other hand, the cases do not lend themselves to precise comparisons.
322. 126 Cal. App. 3d 901, 179 Cal. Rptr. 61 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981). See note 318.
323. Sca/zi, 179 Cal. Rptr. at 62.
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Additionally, keep in mind that rules of evidence do not merely
restate sufficiency criteria. Admissibility rules seek to tailor the
factfinder's task32 4 properly by balancing deference to the factfinder
with the necessities of communication and the bounds of the jury's
role. Admissibility rules do more than avoid the receipt of evidence
that inevitably will lead to incorrect verdicts. Receipt of hearsay can
be an error, therefore, even though a particular decision to admit
evidence may not inevitably lead to an incorrect verdict. If rules of
admissibility were equivalent to rules of sufficiency, they would create
one of two anomalous outcomes: Judges who refused to admit
evidence unless it provided a sufficient basis, in their eyes, for a
verdict would have a stranglehold on juries' discretion. Alternatively,
judges could rely on their ability to direct a verdict as an ex post
control, in which case rules of admissibility would be pointless.
Insofar as defenders of the literalist heuristic argue that rul-
ings consistent with the theory admit useful evidence that is not oth-
erwise admissible, the question is why the evidence is useful and why
it is not otherwise admissible. If the evidence is inadmissible because
it would not satisfy the residual exceptions, then the case for
admission is hardly compelling. Similarly, if one argues that the
evidence is necessary because the proffering party has little or no
other evidence, the lack of evidence, if anything, supports exclusion.
On the other hand, the argument might be another way of contending
that classifying implied assertions as hearsay would force overuse of
the residual exceptions.
Because it seems difficult to square the language of the rule
and the Advisory Committee's comment with the literalist heuristic,
courts should not impute the literalist view to Congress, 32> and instead
should directly confront whether a particular implied assertion fits
within an exception. Adopting the co-operative view that implied
assertions from communicative conduct are hearsay will encourage
more realistic treatment of hearsay reform issues, producing more
workable exceptions in the long run (including modification of the
residual exceptions).32 6 Finally, even if courts who rely on the literalist
324. In narrowing the reach of the hearsay classification, American courts (particularly
appellate courts) could be relying on the context in which they address legal problems: primarily
in formal writing, in which communication is less context-dependent and in which one can more
sensibly speak of the true or timeless meaning of a statement or series of words. Thus, the
appellate courts may construe communications more narrowly, as if the communications were on
paper.
325. See notes 175-88 and accompanying text.
326. Any argument for classifying implied assertions as nonhearsay under the current rules,
rather than remitting them to the residual or other exceptions, would have to rely on the
Advisory Committee's Note to 801(a), which predated the current form of Rule 804. Seidelson, 24
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heuristic admit useful evidence, the test is hardly an unalloyed bless-
ing. Consider the uniform, virtually automatic classification of ques-
tions as nonhearsay. It is doubtful that an approach that encourages
such wooden principles is without practical disadvantages. Although
judicial intuitions may have prevented any disasters to date, the liter-
alist heuristic's hearsay doctrine is arcane and artificial, and thus
fertile ground for formal manipulation in the service of shallow analy-
sis.
VI. CONCLUSION
Cognitive science is rich in new ideas for the study of inference
and evidence. It offers insights that courts and commentators can use
in the absence of equations or knowledge about artificial intelligence.
Findings about the limited nature of humans' mental workspace un-
Duquesne L. Rev. at 750 (cited in note 36). Rule 804, as proposed when the Note was drafted, was
more permissive than the current rule. Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States District
Courts & Magistrates, Prop. R. Evid. 8-01(a), Advisory Committee's Note, Prop. R. Evid 8-04(a)
(Prelim. Draft 1969), reprinted in 46 F.R.D. 161 (1969). See Seidelson, 24 Duquesne L. Rev. at
749-50. Accordingly, it is difficult to read the residual exceptions to imply limitations on the
treatment of implied assertions in the comment to F.R.E. 801(a). Although classifying implied as-
sertions as nonhearsay might lead to use of the residual exceptions beyond that intended by the
Advisory Committee, it is doubtful that Congress intended to adopt the literalist heuristic. In
addition, a growing number of scholars believe the residual exceptions are in need of reform in
any event. See note 252. Accordingly, the case for admitting hearsay that cannot meet the
residual exceptions as written is not particularly compelling.
Professor Weissenberger recently argued similarly that the literalist heuristic suited the
rulemakers because it would avoid a number of problems with the Hillmon doctrine. He points
out that if one offers A's statement, 'm going to the store tonight with B," along with evidence
that A went to the store that night, to show B was present at the store that night, the profferring
party is relying on an implied assertion about B's intention-that B has agreed, and indeed plans,
to go tothe store with A. Weissenberger, 64 Temple L. Rev. at 162-63 (cited in note 40). The
literalist approach therefore allows the evidence against B by classifying the implied assertion
about B's intention as nonhearsay. This argument has at least two flaws. First, it is doubtful that
Congress intended to allow the statement to show B's behavior. See House Comm. on Judiciary,
Fed. Rules of Evidence, H.R. Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1973); 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075,
7087. Accordingly, the lawmakers most likely did not share Professor Weissenberger's
understanding of the effect of Rules 801 and 803(3). Second, and more technically, because the
statement about B's plans does not mention the sources of the information contained therein, the
statement necessarily communicates A's belief that B planned to go to the store with A. F.R.E.
803(3) would not except A's assertion of belief about B's plans, offered to show the truth of the fact
believed, from the hearsay prohibition. Professor Weissenberger does not analyze the apparent
conflict between his reliance on the Advisory Committee's assumption that implied assertions are
not sufficiently dangerous to warrant exclusion as hearsay and their insistence that statements of
belief should be inadmissible to show the truth of the fact believed. F.R.E. 803(3), Advisory
Committee's Note. In favor of admission, Professor Weissenberger might argue that a statement
like A's would almost always result from B's communication of B's plans, and that A's repetition of
those plans might have occurred in a context that would satisfy a hearsay exception. Although
accepting that argument might entail abandonment of Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96
(1933), overruled on other grounds by Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), this Article sets
aside that question, and questions about the proper effect of Hillmon, for another time.
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derscore the importance of communicating to the jury only those data
sufficiently useful to warrant the jury's cognitive effort to evaluate
those data. Rules of admissibility need not be drawn from a skeptical
view of jurors' abilities; rather, they recognize the value of the jurors'
experience in the context of a system in which the factfinder passively
depends on the parties, and, in jury trials, on the judge.
More specifically, cognitive research shows that understanding
and evaluating communication is an inferential process. When a
party offers an out-of-court statement as evidence of an event about
which the speaker communicated, the jury's function requires that the
parties provide data that will allow the jury to appraise the speaker's
intentions in making the statement, as well as the speaker's implicit
claim of co-operation. The exceptions to the hearsay rule require that
the offering party provide such data as a foundation for hearsay
statements.
When deciding whether a statement is hearsay for a particular
purpose, courts should recognize that propositions the speaker gener-
ally intends the hearer to understand from the communication should
be part of an assertion for purposes of the hearsay rule. Classifying
assertions implied from communicative conduct as hearsay facilitates
factfinders' use of their experience in informal reasoning at
trial-albeit with a rule some consider elitist.
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